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ARTICLES
EMERGING COMMONS AND TRAGIC INSTITUTIONS
BY
BRIGHAM DANIELS*
For the past forty years, scholars have developed an immense
literature devoted to understanding and solving the tragedy of the
commons. The most prominent solutions to this- tragedy have focused
on building and maintaining stable institutions. This Article reexamines
this foundational literature by exploring the costs of stability In many
cases, far more than is generally recognized, the way we value the
commons changes. When values change, stable institutions that once
made perfect sense become rigid institutions that block change. This
Article explains how institutions most able to solve the tragedy of the
commons often cause a tragedy of another sort. To ground theory in
practice, this Article examines three case studies: the United States'
governance of the radio spectrum, the founding of Yellowstone
National Park, and western water law. This Article ends by proposing a
set of &-aft principles to help us overcome institutional rigidity. For
decades, commons scholarship has focused on the tragedy of overuse.
This Article re-frames the commons debate, explicitly taking into
account not only the benefits of stable institutions but also their costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
About forty years ago Garrett Hardin recounted what has become the
world's most famous environmental fable: the story of a tribe of herdsmen
who grazed their cows in an open field.1 The herdsmen lived by a simple
1 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
20071 EMERGING COMMONS AND TRA GIC INSTITTIONS 517
rule: when a herdsman added a cow to the pasture, he took it home for the
slaughter. For generations the herdsmen grazed their cows in relative peace.
But, if one were looking, problems started to appear. As the herdsmen added
more cows, grass became increasingly sparse, the terrain more trampled,
and the cows a little crowded. The herdsmen slowly came to understand that
adding cows meant more strain on the pasture and that this threatened the
herd and their way of life. Yet, each herdsman continued to add cows to the
pasture, all the while resenting others that did the'same. No herdsman would
cut back; each feared that if he did, others would simply continue adding
cows.
This ends the story. We are left to wonder if the herdsmen eventually
pushed the pasture over the brink and if so, at what cost. But Hardin's
message rings clear: the individually rational interest to overuse the
commons inevitably resulted in a collectively tragic outcome. Hardin
famously termed this clash that threatened the pasture-and even the
herdsmen-the tragedy of the commons'2
Scholars have applied Hardin's insight in a dizzying number of contexts
to explain real-world problems,3 including air pollution,4 water use, 5 water
2 Others have made many of the points made by Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons.
Elinor Ostrom traces elements of Hardin's argument as far back as Aristotle. ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTfrTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2-3 (James
E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS]. Hardin
was not even alone among his contemporaries in identifying what has become known as the
tragedy of the commons. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-
Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 124 (1954); Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rghtls 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-55 (1967). Nonetheless, "Hardin gave the
problem a vivid and visceral name that quickly captures our attention and tells us much of what
we need to know." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difflcult: The Obstacles to Governing
the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000).
3 A LexisNexis search of "tragedy of the commons" produces 1,618 results in the Law
Reviews, CLE, Legal Journals & Periodicals Combined Database (completed on June 28, 2007).
4 See WILLIAM D. NORDAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 1 (1994); Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons:
What Have We Learned?, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 197, 202-03 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds.,
2002); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1245 ("In a reverse way, the
tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of pollution. Here it is not a question of taking
something out of the commons, but of putting something in... noxious and dangerous fumes
into the air."); Thompson, supra note 2, at 253-55 ("The danger of global climate change
presents a slightly different form of commons dilemma. Rather than taking something out of the
commons, people are putting something in-CO and other greenhouse gases.").
5 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 146-49, 157-73 (explaining the
overdrafting of California groundwater and problems associated with Sri Lankan irrigation
efforts including the large number of farmers involved); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
supra note 1, at 1245 (explaining how the world's oceans are being unsustainably exploited);
Thompson, supra note 2, at 249-53 (explaining that -groundwater is a natural commons being
exploited); David J. Hayes, Privatization and Control of U.S. Water Supplies; 18 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T. 19, 23 (2003) (also explaining that groundwater is being exploited).
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pollution,6 fisheries,7 parkland and wildlife conservation,' logging and other
uses of forest products, 9 grazing,'0 and gas and oil extraction.1" The tragedy
of the commons is increasingly used to explain diverse non-environmental
problems as well, including the ability of developing countries to raise and
collect taxes,' 2 the prevalence of telemarketing, 13 administration of the
criminal justice system, 4 the provision of health care,'5 and United States
6 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1245 (explaining the effects of
factory pollution on water); Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierr, 33 ENVTL. L. 1, 4-5
(2003) (explaining that pollution of Lake Tahoe is a classic example of the tragedy of the
commons); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977) explaining:
(T]he primary purpose of the effluent limitations and guidelines was to provide
uniformity among the federal and state jurisdictions enforcing the NPDES program and
prevent the 'Tragedy of the Commons' that might result if jurisdictions can compete for
industry and development by providing more liberal limitations than their neighboring
states.
Id
7 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2 at 144-46, 149-57, 173-78 (explaining
the failures of institutions to overcome the tragedy of the commons in fisheries in Turkey, Nova
Scotia, and Sri Lanka); E. N. Anderson, Jr., A Malaysian Tragedy of the Commons, in THE
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 327, 328-29
(Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1990) (discussing the overfishing of stocks in the
west Malayasian fishery, evidenced through trawl-hawls made up almost entirely of
undeveloped organisms, while attempted fishing is still abundant); Thompson, supra note 2, at
247-49 (describing the depletion of the world's fisheries as a tragedy of the commons).
8 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1245 ("The National Parks
present another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons.., they are open to
all, without limit .... The values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we
must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone."); Thomas
Lund, Nineteenth Century Wildlife Law- A Case Study of Elite Influence, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 935,
936-38 (2001) (explaining the loss of wildlife in the United States in the late nineteenth
century).
9 See Clark C. Gibson et al., Explaining Deforestation: The Role of Local Institutions, in
PEOPLE AND FORESTS: COMMUNrIES, INSTITIONS AND GOVERNANCE 1, 6-7 (Clark C. Gibson et al.
eds., 2000) (discussing the problems that arise from individuals treating forests as private goods
and ignoring interests of the collective); Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and
Cultural Diversity Emerging Recognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under
International Environmental Law, 59 TENN. L. REV. 735, 751 (1992) (explaining effects of forest
devastation).
10 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1245 (recounting how
pressure is continually applied by cattlemen to increase head counts on national land leases,
resulting in erosion and weed dominance); George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public
Rangeland Management I- The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVrL L. 535, 547
(1982) (arguing that the collapse of rangeland ecosystems in the late 19th century was partially
due to their status as unregulated commons).
" See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated
Market The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 15, 16 (1987) (applying
Hardin's principles to natural gas reserves).
12 See Daniel Berkowitz & Wei iU, Tax Rights in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the
Commons?, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 369, 370-71 (2000).
13 See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 87 (2003).
14 See A-C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating
CriminalAppellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1167-68 (1997).
15 See Michael Gochfeld, Joanna Burger & Bernard D. Goldstein, Medical Care as a
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drug policy,16 among others. Certainly the broad application of the theory
not only grows out of Hardin's piercing insight but also out of the realization
that commons are almost everywhere we look. The power of the fable
explains why more than one hundred anthologies in diverse disciplines have
excerpted Hardin's article.1 7 Its vast application has made it a cornerstone of
environmental scholarship. 8
Hardin's simple story has also inspired a rich literature challenging and
exploring a core assumption-that the herdsmen (or any other users of a
commons)19 cannot craft a better resolution.20 Are commons resources
necessarily tragic? Relying primarily on empirical studies, scholars have
explored a variety of tools that can support sustainable management, such
as persuasion, coercion, bribes, and iterative interactions.21 Much of this
literature, however, has focused on the role of institutions.22 We have
learned that tragedy is not our only option, and in some cases we even find
Comnmons, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE
AMERICAS 253, 253 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001).
16 See DAVID W. RASMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A DRUG WAR:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE COMMONS 20-21 (1994).
17 The Garrett Hardin Society keeps a bibliography of Hardin's work. While not updated
since September 2001, the bibliography purports that 111 anthologies have included THE
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS. The Garrett Hardin Society, Garrett Hardin Bibliography,
http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/docs/gh-bibliography.articles.pdf (last visited July 15,
2007).
18 See David Feeny et al., The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later, 18 HUM.
ECOLOGY 1, 2 (1990).
19 By "commons" this article refers to resources with two traits: 1) rivalry, and 2) difficulties
excluding others. For a more complete definition, see infra Part H.A.
20 See e.g., OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2; CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 37 (1994); ROBERT M.
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 19-23 (1984); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1982); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 2 (Jon Elster & Gudmund Hernes
eds., 1987); MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Daniel W. Bromley ed.,
1992); PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES 10 (Susan Hanna
& Mohan Munasinghe eds., 1995); Anderson, supra note 7; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES:
ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989);
Tietenberg, supra note 4; ELINOR OSTROM, RoY GARDNER & JAMES WALKER, RULES, GAMES, &
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 19-20 (1994); Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A
Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Managemen 4 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 247 (1992) [hereinafter McKean, Success on the Commons].
21 See generaIfyAXELROD, supra note 20 (discussing strategies to encourage cooperation and
particularly focusing on the importance of iterative interactions and reciprocity); HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 20 (discussing the power of expected future interactions in
promoting cooperation); MICHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION 10 (1976) (stressing the
importance of iterative interactions and the roles of norms); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson,
Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 253-54 (1982) (discussing the
role of reputation and esteem in shaping behavior).
22 The focus on institutions looks at mechanisms that restrict access to the commons
without dividing the commons into pieces. Margaret A. McKean, Common Property, in PEOPLE
AND FORESTS: COMMUNITIES, INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 27, 36 [hereinafter
McKean, Common Property]. For a more detailed explanation of institutions, see infra Part
III.A.
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what Carol Rose has called the "comedy of the commons."23 Indeed, the
most famous scholar in this field, Elinor Ostrom, has emphatically identified
key design principles of stable institutions that, if employed, help users
withstand the tragedy of the commons.24 Due to their ability to protect
commons and commons users, these institutions are much admired. In fact,
Nobel Prize winner Douglass North calls Ostrom's design principles
commandments rather than principles.25 However, it turns out these
principles, and stable institutions more generally, have an unexplored
downside.
To make this clear, let's add another chapter to the herdsmen's story.
Assume that the herdsmen created a governing institution that limited the
herd to the-maximum number of cows the pasture could maintain without
showing signs of overgrazing. The herdsmen were given the ability to change
the rules by majority vote. The institution also defined which herdsmen
could use the commons and to what extent. The tribal chiefs approved of the
arrangement, and the herdsmen abided by it. In fact, the herdsmen even
began to work together to expand the pasture by clearing away non-edible
ground cover, shrubs, and even small trees to make room for more grass.
From the herdsmen's perspective, the institution was a great success.
Viewed more broadly, however, the institution's success is less clear.
Expanding the pasture resulted in unintended consequences. Clearing away
land for grasses increased erosion. Particularly when it rained, the stream
that meandered through the pasture was visibly dirtier downstream from the
pasture. And, many in the tribe suspected that the herdsmen's management
of the pasture had muddied the stream. A band of fishers in the tribe
complained that the dirty water hurt their fishing grounds and called for the
herdsmen to take action.
The herdsmen met. They agreed that the rules governing the pasture
had nothing to do with dirty water or fish. Additionally, many of the
herdsmen remained skeptical that the pasture, or even the dirty water, had
anything to do with the declining stock of fish. Others argued fish were not
the concern of herdsman. The herdsmen decided not to act. In fact, they
continued grazing, expanding the pasture, causing erosion, and killing fish.
The herdsmen were unwittingly causing other problems too. The land
cleared for pasture was an important breeding ground for several birds
hunted by the tribe, and clearing away plants had made the area less
desirable habitat. Further, by clearing away plants and reducing soil
stability, the herdsmen made the entire tribe more vulnerable to landslide
risks.
In terms of maintaining the level of forage in the commons, it is easy to
call the herdsmen's institution a success. In fact, many probably would.
After all, the tribe avoided a tragedy of the commons, cooperated to solve
23 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986).
24 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supm note 2, at 88-102.
25 Douglass C. North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic World Institutonal Economics, Property
Rights and the Global Environmen4 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (1999) [hereinafter North,
Deaing with a Non-Ergodic World].
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their problems, and prospered because of it. In doing so, though, they held
rival values of the commons hostage. Despite themselves, their institution
became a tragic institutiolr the institution's most valuable characteristic-
stability-maximized the herdsmen's values but at the same time obstructed
efforts to protect rival values, such as the health of the fishery.26 Viewed
from the outside, the herdsmen's gain came at a steep social price. When
society changes the way it values the commons, the way we might evaluate
the herdsmen's stable institution might also change. While this stable
institution spared the herdsmen from the tragedy of the commons, it later
obstructed change and complicated problems for other commons users.
In fact, the pursuit to build stable commons institutions systematically
creates four important barriers to emerging values. First, we often design
institutions to govern the commons with a narrow vision of why a commons
has value. Commons institutions are intentionally myopic. The herdsmen
looked at a field and saw a pasture; salmon fishers see rivers and oceans in
terms of salmon habitat; jurisdictions attempting to limit greenhouse gases
look at forests as greenhouse gas sinks; wilderness advocates see remote
places as areas "where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled
by man."2" Our tendency to focus on one use of a commons at a time sets
institutions on a path-dependent course at the outset.
Second, we specifically design commons institutions to resist change.
These institutions are inertial by design, not by accident. If commons users
are going to give up specific liberties or other benefits (such as grazing as
many cows as they want), they equally want assurances that the deal will
stick over time. Also, stability breeds resistance to change by enhancing a
shared worldview that favors and perpetuates the values the institution
serves. In a dynamic world, stability is not only a virtue but also a vice. When
we change the way we value the commons, stability transforms into rigidity.
Third, those with a stake in incumbent institutions often invest and
cooperate to maintain, and ideally expand, their gnip on the commons. This
public choice problem amplifies the costs of institutional change. Examples
are abundant: the American Petroleum Association, the National Association
of Broadcasters, Trout Unlimited, and the Wilderness Society all work to
assure that commons institutions work to the advantage of particular
commons users. Furthermore, incumbent users often form symbiotic
relationships with political power brokers: interest groups provide political
constituencies and governments deliver political rewards. Rent-seeking,
agency capture, and symbolic politics naturally follow, and disenfranchised
stakeholders are often marginalized.
Fourth, sometimes a use of a commons physically alters the commons,
making change more difficult. For example, logging a forest can create
difficulties for alternative uses such as tourism, wildlife c onservation, or
preservation of old growth stands. If values shift, a logged forest will take a
26 An institution is a "tragic institution" when, by protecting incumbents, it increases the
transaction costs of forming institutions to protect rival values of a commons. See infra Part
V1I.B.
27 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136, § 1131(c) (2000).
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considerable amount of time and effort to restore, if restoration is possible
at all; some old growth forests may not return for centuries-if ever-and
some species within the forest may become extinct.
Stable institutions that govern commons are not in and of themselves
problematic. Difficulties arise when they confront emerging values.
Commons can provide different values to diverse sets of users-what
seemed a bug infested swamp to some may be prized as an important buffer
to flooding by others; lands the government was willing to give away are
later cherished as a national treasure. We may value the same commons for
many diverse-often conflicting-purposes, ranging from resource
extraction to recreation to aesthetic enjoyment. Given competing values,
defining what a commons is almost invariably results in tradeoffs. At the
time governing institutions were created, a particular use may have
dominated users' interest in the commons. As circumstances change,
however, emerging values may come into view and existing commons
institutions may stand in the way of protecting them.
Thus, emerging commons and tragic institutions come in pairs. The
scholarship focused on the commons has surprisingly ignored this simple
point. Yet, the commons have not: institutions built to address yesterday's
problems become today's obstacles to change. Try as we might to address
the tension between stability and responsiveness by reforming commons
management in a piecemeal fashion, we often find that the stubborn
institutions of the past act as formidable stumbling blocks. This problem is
not of merely theoretical interest. The clash between institutions built to last
and changing values lies at the heart of many of the most difficult resource
conflicts in the recent past, from spotted owls in the Northwest's old growth
forests to the debates over drilling in the Artic National Wildlife Reserve.
Nor is this confined to environmental conflicts, as the recent difficulties in
unseating incumbent users of the analog radio spectrum makes clear.
Part II takes up the challenges of protecting the commons. It explains
how management of open-access commons poses difficulties for restricting
access and promoting cooperation among commons users. It also addresses
the related difficulties of convincing commons users to cut back and the
hurdles of promoting collective action to protect the commons.
Part III looks at the basic tools used to build and maintain stable
institutions to protect the commons-in particular, credible commitments
and threats. This Part ends with a discussion of institutional traits that tend
to create stability in the commons.
Part IV explores emerging commons and discusses how crowding
causes values of the commons to change over time. A series of practical
examples illustrate both how values change and the political economy of
different groups driving this change.
Part V examines tragic institutions and illustrates clashes between
stable institutions and emerging commons. It explains why tragic
institutions occur and provides a framework to evaluate tragic institutions.
Moving from theory to practice, Part VI applies the framework to three
real-life examples that highlight conflicts between emerging commons and
[Vol. 37:515
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incumbent institutions. Specifically, it explores governance of the analog
radio spectrum, the founding of Yellowstone Park and the subsequent
eviction of Yellowstone's historic users, and the challenges of managing
water use in the western United States. This Part ends by synthesizing the
case studies and introducing four typologies of tragic institutions.
Part VII examines how a clearer understanding of emerging commons
and tragic institutions should alter our approach to governing the commons.
In designing institutions, we need to find ways to supplement stable
institutions with responsive institutions: institutions that recognize
complexities and evolve with new information, integrate piecemeal policies,
allow trading of use rights within acceptable bounds, internalize the costs of
incumbent users, and provide users the incentive to conserve the commons.
Part VII recognizes that institutional fragility may limit opportunities to build
responsive institutions and emphasizes that responsiveness introduces some
risks. Yet, as a whole, it suggests more responsiveness and less stability
would serve the broadest good.
II. CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING THE COMMONS
The first step in explaining the conflict between emerging commons
and incumbent institutions lies in appreciating the well-documented
challenges of building governance institutions in the first place. Recognizing
the hurdles to effective governance of the commons helps explain why
commons institutions tend to resist change and lock in benefits for select
commons users. This Part summarizes the relevant literature and focuses on
three major challenges to imposing rules in an open-access commons.25 Part
II.A looks at how the traits of commons make it hard to either restrict access
to or promote cooperation among commons users. Part II.B explores the
difficulties in convincing commons users to cut back their consumption.
Finally, Part II.C examines difficulties facing those promoting collective
action.
A. Challenges Imbedded in the Tra'ts of a Commons
A commons is a natural or manufactured resource with two defining
characteristics. First, one person using a commons diminishes the amount of
commons available for others.29 Thus, preserving a commons hinges on
28 An "open-access commons" refers to a commons with no mechanism to restrict access to
the commons. Daniel W. Bromley, Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes, in
MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 3, 4.
29 The main difference between a commons and a public good is that a public good does not
consume or diminish the resource. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986); Robert 0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom,
Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND
COOPERATION IN Two DOMAINS 13-15 (Robert 0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995); C. Ford
Runge, Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development; in MAING THE
COMMONS WORK: THEORY PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 17, 26. In practice, sometimes it
is difficult to distinguish public goods from commons. Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 29, at 14.
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restricting consumption. This is unfortunate because the second
characteristic of a commons is the difficulty of excluding potential users."
Classic examples of commons include fisheries, public highways, parks, and
public squares1.
3
Difficulties in excluding potential users of a commons pose significant
challenges. First, a person acting alone and reducing his own consumption
will not only fail to achieve much but also will create an opportunity for
other users to consume that part of the commons instead.32 Second, and
related, it is difficult to convince other users to cut back because commons
users face constant "temptations to free-ride and shirk."' Indeed, this is
Hardin's fundamental point: users have an incentive to continue using the
commons even in the knowledge that continued use will lead to a collective
tragedy. Because keeping users out is difficult, the costs of convincing
commons users to cut back voluntarily-or due to coercion-are often
substantial.34
Given the difficulties in restricting access and in promoting
cooperation, it sometimes seems entirely rational to keep a commons as an
open-access commons.35 When, for example, there is enough of the
commons to meet the demands of all potential users, the costs of institutions
30 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 30; TOM TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 598 (5th ed. 2000); Elinor Ostrom,
Reformulating the Commons, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 15, at 17-18 [hereinafter Ostrom, Reformulating the
Commonsj]; ORAN YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 140 (2002).
While the definition of "commons" is straightforward, inconsistent use has somewhat muddled
the term. McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 27, 30. Perhaps as an effort to remedy
this, scholars have given commons different labels including "common-pool resources" (CPRs)
and "common-pool goods." Id. at 28.
31 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1245 (asserting that fisheries
and national parks both suffer from the tragedy of the commons); see also supra notes 4-16 and
accompanying text.
32 See Ostrom, Reformulating the Commons, supra note 30, at 17, 35; Thompson, supra note
2, at 242.
33 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 15.
34 The costs referred to here are transaction costs, meaning the price of understanding,
making, monitoring, and enforcing deals. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 15 (1960); JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 31 (1992); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 27 (1990)
[hereinafter NORTH, INSTITUTIONS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35 (4th ed.
1992); Douglass C. North, Transaction Costs Through Time, in TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
149, 149 (Claude Menard ed., 1997) [hereinafter Transaction Costs Through Tme]; Oliver E.
Williamson, Efflieiency, Power, Authority and Economic Organization, in TRANSACTION COST
ECONOMICS AND BEYOND 11, 16-20 (John Groenewegen ed., 1996). From the view of the
individual, we can say that transaction costs are "all those costs that cannot be conceived to
exist in a Robinson Crusoe (one-man) economy." Steven N.S. Cheung, On the New Institutional
Economics, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS 48, 51 (Lars Werin & Hans Wikander eds., 1992). At a
more global level, transaction costs are the costs extracted by institutions and the
organizations, including the costs of creating, maintaining, and changing institutions. See
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activio Issues Pertinent to the Choice of
Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POuCY ANALYSIS 59, 60
(Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1970).
35 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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may outweigh their perceived benefits.36 Additional restrictions only begin
to make sense when the users recognize limits and the reality of rivalry
becomes tangible.37
B. Challenges of Convincing Commons Users to Cut Back
Crowding in the commons does not necessarily mean commons users will
want to cut back.3 To the contrary, commons users often resist efforts to
restrict access to the commons even when this would presumably benefit
them. 9 Therein lies the seeds of the tragedy of the commons.
One difficulty in cutting back arises from the way-the commons distribute
costs and benefits. Protecting the commons is good for all users collectively.
Yet, the costs of cutting back are distributed to individual commons users: fewer
of his cows in the pasture or fish in her pan.40 Given this reality, commons users
may rationally fear that they will disproportionately bear the costs.
Additionally, time horizons may cause commons users to discount the
benefits of cutting back more than they discount the costs because the costs of
cutting back often accrue immediately whereas the payoff of reductions often
looms in the future." Uncertainties surrounding benefits may also justify
discounting.4" Some users may question whether cutting back is necessary at
all.' The more complex the commons, generally the more difficult it is to
forecast how foregoing consumption will benefit users. Additionally, long time
horizons may introduce the possibility that sacrifices today will be undone by
users in the future changing or skirting the rules of the game."
36 See McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 30. Distinctions between public goods
and commons fade when rivalry for a commons is not present. See id at 28-29; Keohane &
Ostrom, supra note 29, at 15.
37 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1244 (identifying the driving
force behind the tragedy of the commons as increasing resource use "without limit-in a world
that is limited").
38 For a detailed discussion of crowding, see infra Part IV.A.
39 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 243.
40 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1244.
41 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 34-35; JEAN-MARIE BALAND & JEAN-
PHILIPPE PLATrEAU, HALTING DEGRADATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: Is THERE A ROLE FOR RURAL
COMMUNmES? 343-44 (1996).
42 See Martin L. Weitzman, Just Keep Discounting, But..., i DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 23, 28-29 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999) (noting that
"[w]hile there is uncertainty about almost everything in the deep future, perhaps the most
fundamental uncertainty of all concerns the discount rate itself"); OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS, supra note 2, at 35 (pointing out that those "who are uncertain whether or not there
will be sufficient food to survive the year will discount future returns heavily when traded off
against increasing the probability of survival during the current year"); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 945-47 (1999) (discussing discounting environmental regulatory benefit).
43 See Margaret McKean, Traditional Common Lands in Japan, in MAKING THE COMMONS
WORK: THEORY PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 63, 88 [hereinafter McKean, Common
Lands in Japan].
44 Id; Elinor Ostrom, Rudiments of a Theory of Common-Property Institutions, in MAKING
THE COMMONS WORK THEORY PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 293, 303 [hereinafter
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Lastly, a number of well-documented psychological effects also help
explain why commons users often find cutting back difficult 4 5 People often
systematically fixate on potential loss more than they appreciate potential
gains.4 6 Similarly, once people possess something, they tend to place a higher
value on it.47 In other words, cutting back in the commons is difficult because
cutting back benefits is always psychologically difficult-often to an
economically irrational extent.
C. Problems of Engineering Collective Act'ion
Because the traits of a commons make going it alone unattractive and
because cutting back is so difficult, cooperation is essential in restricting
access to the commons. Yet, engineering collective action is often difficult as
well.48
Difficulties creep in for several reasons. First, some commons users
may attempt to free ride-willingly benefiting from restricted access while
avoiding paying for it.49 Free riding may arise in part because the commons
invite such behavior,' in part because of the difficulties in cutting back,51
and in part because some people are just prone to free ride.52 Moreover, a
small amount of free riding can have a catalytic effect and unravel efforts to
build cooperation. 53
Ostrom, Common-Property Institutions].
45 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
341, 341 (1984) [hereinafter Choices]; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effec4 LossAversion and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
193, 194 (1991); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory. An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect
Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 Sc. 453, 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky'& Kahneman, Framing of Decisions. See
also Thompson, supra note 2, at 256-57 (discussing cognitive psychology literature in the
context of the commons).
46 See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 45, at 282.
47 See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 45, at 194; Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CuI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1997); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory
of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 42 (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalneman,
Loss Aversion in Riskiess Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039, 1039
(1991).
48 "Collective action problems" are transaction costs that reflect the difficulties of
coordinating actions that are not present when an actor acts alone. See MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-2 (1965); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 222 (1986); OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 5-7,
36.
49 A "free rider" is someone who does not pitch in but benefits from the actions of others
nonetheless. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 48, at 222.
50 See supra Part ILA.
51 See supra Part ll.B.
52 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 36.
53 See id.; Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Appropriating the Commons-A
Theoretical Explanaion, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 4, at 157, 159-61 (noting
"[a] large body of evidence indicate fairness and reciprocity are powerful determinants of
human behavior"); Ronald Oakerson, Analyzing the Commons, in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK:
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Additionally, coordinating behavior may prove more difficult in some
commons contexts than in others. As group size increases, so do collective
action costs.51 This makes sense because two of the most significant
collective action costs are spreading information and coordinating behavior:
the larger the group, the more people to inform and coordinate.5 5 Likewise,
the more dispersed the benefits of the commons, the greater the transaction
costs associated with collective action.56 Collective action favors small,
tight-knit groups that have a lot to gain and are able to muster the political
resources to coordinate collective action.57
Finally, it is generally presumed that the lower the geographic
concentration of commons users, the more costly it is for them to coordinate
collective action.58 The same is true of societies with greater diversity of
cultures, religions, or race.59 Whether the distance between users is
geographic, cultural, linguistic, or emotional, collective action costs
increase.
III. BUILDING AND MAINTAINING STABLE INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMONS
Part II discussed both the importance and difficulty in gaining the
support of commons users to restrict access to the commons. This Part
surveys the policy tools used to build and maintain institutions that restrict
access, even in the face of disinterest or resistance.6'
Part III.A briefly defines "institutions" and discusses how institutions
help govern the commons. Part III.B then turns to the role of credible
commitments and threats in gaining the support .of commons users. Part
Ill.C discusses the design principles of stable institutions identified in the
THEORY PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 41, 49-51 (arguing "[firee-riding behavior erodes
reciprocity"); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The L.iberal Conunons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 576-
77 (2001) (noting parties may be motivated by "[n]ot wanting to be suckers").
54 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 48, at 44; OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at
202-05; Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335,
345 (1974); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 359, 360-62 (1974.).
55 See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 357 (discussing this problem in the collective negotiating
context).
56 See Oakerson, supra note 53, at 41-42.
57 See HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 20, at 38-49 (discussing Olson's theory of the
relationship between group size and probability of success in collective action). See also ARUN
AGRAWAL, GREENER PASTURES: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND COMMUNITY AMONG A MIGRANT PASTORAL
PEOPLE 59-60 (1999) (describing how disparate interests between shepherds and upper caste
villagers led to a politically-driven Pareto inferior outcome among the people of Patawal).
58 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 146-49 (describing difficulties of
collective action in the context of groundwater basins in large San Bernadino County,
California, despite the availability of institutional means); BALAND & PLATrEAU, supra note 41, at
302; ARUN AGRAWAL AND CLARKE C. GIBSON, COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1-12 (2001)
(discussing different factors that contribute to group homogeneity, including size, social
structure, shared interests, and norms).
59 BALAND & PLATrEAU, supra note 41, at 302-04; OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, Supra
note 2, at 166.
60 See supra Part B.A.
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literature, which are often used to explain why some commons institutions
survive while others fail.
A. Institutions and How They Govern the Commons
In everyday use, "institutions" often refer to organizations or to the
buildings that house them. However, in the context of this Article,
"institutions" is meant to refer to the formal and informal "rules of the game"
that "shape human interaction." 61 Formal institutions are codified rules and
informal institutions are unwritten rules and norms.6 Both formal and
informal institutions play important roles in governing the commons. An
example familiar to many law students concerns how Maine lobster
harvesters rely on both state law and longstanding unwritten norms
(enforced by the harvesters) to allocate the right to harvest lobsters. 3
Commons institutions generally restrict access to the commons without
recourse to private property or dividing the commons into pieces.64 Rather,
institutions restrict access of users by changing their incentives to consume
the commons.65 For an institution to alter incentives, commons users must
at least believe consequences flow when they break or follow the rules of
the game. 66 Given the difficulty of excluding potential commons users,
67
monitoring and enforcement are no small tasks. How, though, do potential
rules become the rules of the game?
B. Building Stable Institutions
While commons users may resist cutting back, institutions can alter
their incentives to consume. However, this takes stability, meaning that in an
ongoing way the institution must help commons users overcome
"temptations to free-ride and shirk."' Given the nature of commons
resources, resistance--even passive resistance-increases the transaction
61 NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 3. See also OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS,
supra note 2, at 51; YOUNG, supra note 30, at 30. Importantly, this definition rejects a formalistic
law/society distinction and instead focuses on the rules that motivate people. See KNIGHT, supra
note 34, at 1-3.
62 NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 4; OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2,
at 51.
63 See J. M. Acheson, The Lobster FYefs: Economic and Ecological Effects of Tezritorlity in
the Maine Lobster Induasoy 3 HuM. ECOLOGY 183, 187-92 (1975) (discussing the informal but
effective system of rules and enforcement methods by which lobster fishermen in Maine limit
entry into specific territories); James M. Acheson & Jennifer F. Brewer, Changes in the
Territorial System of the Maine Lobster Industry, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 37,
38 (Nives Dolgak & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003).
64 See McKean, Common Propety, supra note 22, at 36.
65 See Runge, supra note 29, at 17, 27-32; HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 20, at 155.
66 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 94-100; HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION, supra note 20, at 173-87; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 21-52
(1963).
67 See supra Part II.A.
68 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 15.
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costs of establishing the institution. This means institutions often need to
provide both carrots and sticks to promote and cajole cooperation. At a
basic level, commons users must believe that an institution's promises to
restrict access to the commons are credible. While virtually all institutions
use both, for the sake of clarity, Part III.B.1 and Part Il.B.2 respectively
address commitments and threats separately.
1. Credible Commitments
Getting commons users to support proposed institutions often requires
not only inducements but also assurances that inducements will come to
fruition: credible commitments.69  But, how do we make credible
commitments? The answer to this boils down to aligning the incentives of
those governed by institutions with those charged with implementing them.7"
Credible commitments can help build institutions in many contexts.7 In
the commons, making a credible commitment almost always entails giving
some commons users preferred access to the commons: users not only want
institutions to protect the commons but also-and perhaps primarily-to
protect their interests.72 Particularly when a commons is experiencing
crowding, commons users are likely to see institutions as a way to get
protection from competitors. Examples of institutions providing such
commitments in the context of commons include Internet domains, radio
frequencies, BCS football bowl bids, and water rights. Additionally,
grandfathering provisions, like those used in many environmental laws and
land use regulations, give incumbent users benefits to the commons that are
kept from others. 73
Credible commitments must also provide some assurances that the
rules of the game will not change. Not surprisingly, potential benefactors
often view such promises with suspicion.74 A popular means to provide such
an assurance is to give commons users the power to change and enforce the
69 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supni note 2, at 43-45.
70 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPrrAUSM 48-49 (1985).
71 See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POsrrIvE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., Cambridge University
Press 1990); Douglas North & Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Conmitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 803
(1989); Barry R. Weingast, Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL.
SCi. REV. 245, 245 (1997); Oliver E. Williamson, Cre&ble Comnutments Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519,519 (1983).
72 See Ostrom, Common-Property Institutions, supra note 44, at 307; BALAND & PLATTEAU,
supra note 41, at 232 (noting that supposed conservationist communities recounted in literature
might simply have been acting in response to highly visible and localized effects).
73 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3,
3-4 (1971); Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution
Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. REG. 63, 64 (1983); Nathaniel 0.
Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 313, 315 (1998).
74 See Weingast, supra note 71, at 261.
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rules.75 In many small-scale commons, resource users alter, monitor, and
enforce the rules of the commons.76 Another strategy involves giving control
of an institution to a trusted third party, like an agency users believe has
their interests at heart.77 For example, fisheries in the United States are
governed by councils that often are perceived as being dominated by fishing
interests.78
Commitments may also come in the form of simple rules that give
benefits to particular users. It is thought that clear rules are harder to
change because they permeate informal institutions.7' Not surprisingly, clear
rules are frequently found in the institutions governing the commons. For
example, many commons regimes, including water, oil and gas, Internet
domains, and others, allocate access on a "first in time, first in right" basis.
2. Credible Threats
While the commons literature rarely explicitly discusses the concept of
credible threats (though they often are implied), credible threats are the flip-
side of the same coin: monitoring, enforcement, and sanctions are necessary
to make credible commitments8 0 Threats achieve the support of users by
coercing "quasi-voluntary compliance.""' However,. using the stick rather
than the carrot raises a different set of challenges.
First, credible threats hinge on the ability to monitor and enforce the
threat. In some commons, such as vast fisheries, this can be challenging. 2
The need for. adequate monitoring often forces those making threats to
resort to clear, simple rules that are suboptimal to more precise
restrictions.' For example, because they are easy to monitor, we see fishing
seasons and gear restrictions instead of more precise catch limits.'
Additionally, we find' simple rules in many federal environmental laws that
75 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 93-94; ROBERT WADE, VILLAGE
REPUBUICS: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SOUTH INDIA 191 (1988); McKean,
Common Property, supra note 22, at 45.
76 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note '2, at 64-65, 67-68, 73, 77, 80; WADE, supra
note 75, at 96-105, 111-13, 192-94; BALAND & PLATrEAU, supra note 41, at 312-24.
77 See Terry Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 89-95 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1995).
78 See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 21
(2003), available at http://www.pewtrust.com/pdf/pew-science-taking-stock.pdf; Peter Van-
Tuyn, Courage Without Conviction: Cause for Chaos in US. Marine Fisheries Managemen; 28
VT. L. REV, 663, 666 (2004).
79 Ostrom, Common-PropertyInstitutions, supra note 44, at 305-06.
80 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 45; WADE, supra note 75, at 192.
See also SCHELLING, supra note 66, at 12, 15, 22, 160 (providing what is considered the
preeminent discussion about credible threats).
81 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 94.
82 See supra Part I.A.
83 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 96; Ostrom, Common-Property
Institutions, supra note 44, at 305; Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON.
REV. 281, 287-99 (1956).
84 See Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement 61
LAND ECON. 387, 394 (1985).
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regulate important commons. For example, the Clean Water Act simplifies
monitoring by requiring various pollution control technologies.
8
Second, delegating monitoring and enforcement to a committed third
party increases a threat's credibility. 6 For example, when Congress
delegates oversight to an agency, it can provide some credibility by giving
powers to an agency that is more likely to follow through with the threat.
8 7
Likewise, allowing for citizen suits helps make Congress' threats credible,
something Congress has provided to protect various environmental
commons, such as endangered species,88 water bodies," and airsheds.9 °
Third, threats become credible if they are self-enforcing, meaning the
target of the threat has the incentive to monitor itself." Examples of self-
enforcing threats in the commons include record keeping and reporting
violations for permit holders under the Clean Air Act92 and the Clean Water
Act.93 Because these requirements assume a violation if a regulated entity
fails to keep records, the entity has the incentive to monitor itself.
Lastly, incremental threats may also add to the credibility of threats:
enforcement of minor violations tends to increase the credibility of
enforcement of significant violations.94  Many commons institutions,
including federal environmental laws, rely on graduated sanctions to punish
those who break the rules.9 5
C. Maintaining Stable Institutions
The commons literature contains several noteworthy attempts to
generalize about why some institutions are stable and others are not.
Among these efforts, Ostrom's "design principles... [of] ... long-
enduring institutions" is probably the hallmark.96 These design principles
have served as the road map for explaining and addressing many natural
85 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000).
86 See SCHELLING, supra note 66, at 43.
87 Cf Moe, supra note 77, at 89, 92 (describing how such institutional structures are created
mainly with only particularized control by Congress, as that is most conducive to the interests
of members of Congress).
89 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
89 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
90 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000).
91 NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 55.
92 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (2000).
93 33 U.S.C. §§ 1318, 1321(b)(5), 1342 (2000).
94 Schelling, supra note 83, at 297-98.
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e) (2000); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), 1319(g)(3) (2006); OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 94-100; BALA D & PLATTEAu, supra note 41, at 345;
McKean, Common Landsin Japan, supra note 43, at 63, 81-83.
96 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 90-102. Other scholars have also
made helpful though less well known contributions to identify these factors. BALAND &
PLATTEAU, supra note 41, at 343-45; McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 43-50; WADE,
supra note 75, at 215-16. See also Arun Agrawal, Common Resources and Institutional Stablity,
in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 4, at 41-85 (providing a comprehensive review).
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resource challenges, including transboundary water allocation,97
irrigation systems,9 8 subsistence farming,9 9 forest management, 1°° and
wildlife management. 0 1 Additionally, because commons are so abundant,
these principles are increasingly applied to provide solutions to a diverse
array of challenges. For example, these principles have been applied to
intellectual property, 0 2 computer-mediated communication systems, 10
and the radio spectrum.1°4 Nobel Prize winner Douglass North has gone
so far to label Ostrom's principles "commandments" in the context of the
commons.0 5 Stability is so important in this body of scholarship that
scholars within it often use "institutional success" and "institutional
stability" interchangeably.106
Taken together, scholars have identified eight principles related to
the design of stable institutions. 0 7 In reading over them, it is worth
noting how these principles often discourage significant change or
incorporation of competing values. 108
First, stability increases if the nature and identity of use rights to the
commons-who can do what and to what extent-are clearly defined."
Stability is helped along by predetermining who will benefit from the
97 See, e.g., Edmund J. Goodman, Indian Tibal Sovereignty and Water Resources:
Watersheds, Ecosystems and 7i'bal Co-Management; 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 185,
219-20 (2000) (assessing Ostrom's design principles and other management approaches for
transboundary water resources involving tribal co-management).
98 See Elinor Ostrom, Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions, 29 WATER
RESOURCES RESEARCH 1907 (1993) [hereinafter Ostrom, Design Principles].
99 See Catherine Tucker, Common Property Design Principles and Development in a
Honduran Community, 14 FLETCHER J. OF DEV. STUD. 1, 4-5 (1999) (focusing on Ostrom's design
principles while exploring common property management in a case study of a Honduran
community).
100 See Clark C. Gibson, et al., Forests, People and Governance: Some Initial Theoretical
Lessons, in PEOPLE AND FORESTS: COMMUNITIES, INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at
227, 228 [hereinafter Gibson, Forests, People and Governance].
101 See David Schmidtz & Elizabeth Willott, Reinventing the Commons: An African Case
Study, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 203, 219-22 (2003).
102 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1358-61 (1996).
103 See Peter Koliock and Marc Smith, Managing the Virtual Commons: Cooperation and
Conflict in Computer Communities, in COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION: LINGUISTIC,
SOCIAL, AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 109 (Susan Herring ed., 1996).
104 See Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 2, 43-77 (2002), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/
02_STLR_2/article.pdf.pdf.
105 North, Dealing with a Non-Ergodic World, supra note 25, at 10.
106 See, e.g, OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 90; WADE, supra note 75, at
215; McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 44; Bromley, supra note 28, at 3, 4.
107 Scholars have identified principles not related to institutional design and governance that
are not addressed here. See Arun Agrawal, supra note 96, at 41 (synthesizing scholarship).
108 Very few commentators have pointed out that the commons literature's focus on stability
may have a dark underbelly. But see Dagan & Heller, supra note 53, at 566 (noting that the
success of Ostrom's approach requires strong limitations on liberty, which may be unacceptable
to those who highly value personal autonomy).
109 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 91-92; BALAND & PLATrEAU, supra
note 41, at 344; see WADE, supra note 75, at 189.
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institution: those advantaged by the institution tend to support and
protect it.°"0
Second, stability is furthered if the commons' boundaries are clearly
delineated."' The purpose of building commons institutions is to restrict
access to the commons. Boundaries begin to answer the question,
"access to what?" Monitoring the commons becomes much more difficult
if those doing it do not have a clear idea of where to begin and end
monitoring.
Third, we see more stability when commons users have some power
over the rules that govern the commons. 112 This provides them at least
some control to protect their interest in the commons and also make
adjustments to the institution as necessary.
Fourth, stability increases when commons users make up a
homogenous group (i.e., shared geography, culture, and background)." 3
An aspect of this is that of commons users valuing the commons for
similar-or at least compatible-reasons." 4 Agreement about the value of
the commons eliminates the need to make tradeoffs among competing
values and make institutional success simpler to define.
Fifth, institutional stability increases when resource users depend
on the commons for economic gain." 5 When a commons is managed in a
way that results in economic gain, those who stand to gain find time and
take extra care to assure their interests are served.
Sixth, enduring institutions generally rely on simple rules to
maintain stability in the commons." 6 Simple rules can serve the dual
purpose of providing credible commitments and credible threats: they
can lock in clear benefits for select users while at the same time making
monitoring more feasible."
7
Seventh, stable institutions often allow and even encourage
organizations to form to unite resource users and increase
110 See supra Part IRL.B.1. See also Ostrom, Common-Property Institutions, supra note 44, at
293, 307 (discussing how. those with interests view themselves as "co-owners," but that
outsiders may not recognize this title).
111 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 91-92; WADE, supra note 75, at 189;
McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 43-44.
112 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 93-94; McKean, Common Property,
supra note 22, at 45. See WADE, supra note 75, at 191.
113 WADE, supra note 75, at 189-90; BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 41, at 302.
114 See WADE, supra note 75, at 189 (discussing when users want to use commons in the
same way); BALAND & PLATrEAU, supra note 41, at 302-03 (discussing heterogeneity of
interests); see also OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 143-45 (explaining how
heterogeneity among types of fishery users made it difficult to find rules that restricted access
to the commons without also serving the interests of one set of users over another); Gibson,
Forests, People, and Governance, supra note 100, at 231 (describing a shared image of the forest
and understanding of effects of their actions as important attributes of forest users).
115 See WADE, supra note 75, at 215-16; BALAND & PLATTEAU, supra note 41, at 343-44.
116 BALAND & PLATrEAU, supra note 41, at 344; WADE, supra note 75, at 192; McKean, Common
Property, supra note 22, at 46.
117 See supra Part I.B.
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cooperation." 8 This helps reduce the transaction costs of collective
action and builds social capital that engenders trust among commons
users.
Lastly, stability increases when institutions receive the government's
support or at least indifference."1 9 Having government as an ally helps
lock in gains and neutralizes a potential threat: governments often have
the power to modify or even supplant commons institutions along with
the power to legitimize claims by recognizing rights or by providing
enforcement. 1
20
IV. EMERGING COMMONS
The commons literature 'has largely ignored that how we value a
commons can change. 2 ' When circumstances change, dimensions of a
commons that have been obscured can emerge and alter our opinion of what
a commons is, what its limits are, and why and for whom it has value.
Frequently we only come to appreciate different dimensions of a commons
as the costs of our neglect become apparent.
Given the different values bundled within a commons, defining what a
commons is almost invariably results in tradeoffs, whether consciously
made or not; setting up commons institutions creates winners and losers.
While some of the winners and losers are identifiable at the time an
institution is conceived, others will only find that institutions implicate their
interests after an under appreciated dimension of the commons emerges.
Commons institutions generally reflect our tendency to manage the
commons for a single overarching value at a time. Why do we govern the
commons by focusing on single sticks of the metaphorical bundle? Part IV.A
attempts to answer this question by focusing on the role crowding plays in
the way we value the commons. First, Part IV.A.1 explores how competing
usems can cause crowding of a commons. Second, Part IV.A.2 looks'at how
competing uses can crowd out each other. Part IV.B synthesizes when
crowding is most apparent-the context where institutional protections are
most likely to arise.
118 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 101; McKean, Common Property,
supra note 22, at 43.
119 WADE, supra note 75, at 190-92.
120 See infra Part V.B.
121 While little has been written on emerging commons, this is not to say that the complexity
of commons has received no attention at all. See Nives Dolgak and Elinor Ostrom, The
Challenges ofthe Commons, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supni note 63, at 3-5; see
also, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 30, at 3-4; Fikret Berkes, From Community-Based Resource
Management to Complex Systems: The Scale Issue and Marine Commons,
http://www.ecologyandsociety.orgvolll/issl/art45/ (last visited July 15, 2007); Thomas Dietz,
Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stem, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 Sci. 1907, 1908-09
(2003).
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A. Crowding
Scarcity of a commons, also known as crowding, is the primary force
that changes the way we value commons. 12 2 Many scholars have
recognized this.2 Crowding gives real bite to a commons' trait of rivalry:
when there is enough to go around rivalry means little.124 Until crowding
rears its head, users generally show little interest in restricting access.
25
Once crowding sets in, commons users may see restricting access not
only necessary to protect the commons but also to protect their
consumption of it.
Users of a commons may use the commons in different ways.
However, sometimes a particular use of a commons will dominate. For
example, broadcasters dominated use of the radio spectrum for decades
and sustaining agriculture is the primary use of most western rivers. Yet,
most commons can be put to many uses. Relying on the examples just
given, the radio spectrum also enables wireless devices like cell phones
and laptop computers, and western rivers also provide habitat for
wildlife and feed municipal water consumption.
In understanding crowding, it is useful to separate crowding among
users and crowding among uses.
1. Crowding Among Users
Three interrelated factors influence crowding among users
pursuing the same use of the commons: the number of commons users,
the per capita consumption, and the amount of the commons available.
122 Crowding is not the only force of changing values, even if it is the dominant one.
Sometimes particular commons are seen as having value distinct from use value (e.g., animal
rights or ecosystem rights). Yet, such moral claims usually only have limited influence because
many commons are ill suited for such judgments (e.g., airports, the radio spectrum, or public
squares) and even where they do apply, we tend to see a diversity of opinions. In contrast,
crowding increases the value we place on accessing the commons and tends to synchronize the
actions of commons users.
123 See, e.g, Ostrom, Common-Property Institutions, supra note 44, at 293, 299; James T.
Thompson, David Feeny & Ronald J. Oakerson, Institutional Dynamics: The Evolution and
Dissolution of Common-Property Resource Management; in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK:
THEORY PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 129, 133; Einar Eyth6rsson, Stakeholders,
Courts, and Communities: Individual Transferable Quotas in Icelandic Fsheries, 1991-2001, in
THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 63, at 129, 136; Clark C. Gibson, Forest
Resources: Institutions for Local Governance in Guatemala, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 15, at 71, 73; McKean,
Common Property, supra note 22, at 27, 51 n.5; Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, From Free Grass
to Fences: Transforming the Commons of the American West, in MANAGING THE COMMONS 119,
120 (John A. Baden & Douglas S. Noonan eds., 1998).
124 See supra Part II.A.
125 See AGRAWAL, supra note 57, at 40-60 (discussing political disputes in response to the
decline of an Indian village's grazing common); Keohane & Ostrom, supra note 29, at 15
(explaining that "[r]ivalry is not a problem for abundant resources, but it is for scarce ones");
McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 27, 30 (providing that "[o]pen access is an
acceptable method for resource management only when we need not manage resources at all:
when demand is too low to make the effort worthwhile").
ENVJRONMENTAL LA W
Crowding occurs when the following is perceived to be satisfied:
E [(user) x (consumption)]
> (the perceived amount of commons resource available) 126
Given their importance, each factor warrants some attention.
First, consider the impact of crowds on crowding. Perhaps the
paradigmatic example of this sort of crowding is the Earth's growing population.
However, several factors influence the number of users of a commons, including
the size of a population, 127 technological change, 2 levels of wealth, and market
demands.129 While these factors are self-explanatory, importantly, increases in
all of these factors tend to increase strain on commons, yet there are some
notable exceptions. For example, technology can make it less costly to access
the commons (e.g., transportation improvements) or less costly to exclude
others (e.g., the barbed-wire fence). 3 Likewise, wealth might mean more
consumption or the willingness to invest to protect a commons.1 31
Second, consumption largely depends on the use in question, the
technology employed, and the time horizon of commons users. The first two
factors are self-explanatory. Yet, as suggested above, technology changes may
increase or decrease the consumptiveness of a use of a commons. As for time
horizons, generally speaking, the longer the time horizon, the less of a commons
a user will consume.
Third, perception of crowding is more important than actual crowding.
Sometimes we are unaware that crowding is taking place. For example, while
greenhouse gas emissions have been cause for concern for the past two
decades, they began to steadily increase at the onset of the industrial
revolution.'3 2 Similarly, foresight can help us see crowding in the distance. For
example, when John Muir began lobbying to set aside Yosemite, he did so even
though it faced no immediate threat: he believed potential threats loomed in the
future.3 Additionally, perceptions of threats need not be rational; they only
126 This formula is a variant of a formula used by Knight to explain when social actors will
demand institutional change due to the presence of conflict. KNIGHT, supra note 34, at 118.
127 See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, supra note 1, at 1246.
128 See BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 128-29 (1971) (indicating that because
"technologies rapidly transformed the nature of industrial and agricultural production" there
were significant changes after World War H in the "pace of environmental deterioration").
129 See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16-17 (1989) (providing that "an
increase in relative prices... will raise the stream of rents attainable from ownership and
encourage new competition," and "market forces.., can lead to new contracting for property
rights").
130 Anderson & Hill, supra note 123, at 134.
131 See Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequafit, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 7
(1955); BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE
WORLD 33 (1998).
132 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: WORKING
GROUP I: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 6 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001); EPA, Global Warming-
Impacts, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl/pdf/WGITAR-Front.pdf (last visited July 14,
2006).
133 JOHN MUIR, THE YOSEMITE 255-60 (1912).
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need to exist. For example, some have argued that actions to protect some
commons stem from the availability heuristic,"3 which refers to the tendency of
people to overestimate the probability of an event because it is "vivid, well
publicized, or more prevalent among a particular actor's friends and
acquaintances."" 5 A vivid example of problems in a particular commons (e.g.,
the spontaneous burning of the Cuyahoga River) may lead institutions to protect
similar commons (e.g., the Clean Water Act).136
Given that crowding must arise before we build institutions, it is not
surprising we tend to protect the commons a value at a time-the value where
crowding surfaces first.
2. Crowding Among Uses
While the commons literature overwhelmingly focuses on competition
among users that rely on the commons for the same value, sometimes one use of
the commons crowds out other uses. So, crowding can also occur when the
following is satisfied-
E [(use) x (consumption of use)]
> (amount of commons perceived to satisfy uses)13 7
Examples of crowding among uses are many. building a fountain in a public
square limits the space for protesters; using surface water for irrigation may
reduce opportunities for whitewater rafting; use of the radio spectrum for
broadcast media confines opportunities for other technologies that use radio
waves.
Even when crowding emerges, it is often difficult to recognize for several
reasons. First, complexity can obscure our ability to understand that different
uses of the commons may implicate each other."3 For example, it took years of
134 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral.Approach to Law and Economies, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1518 (1998) (noting an individual's judgment of the probability of a harmful event
occurring is influenced by available examples of the harm); Sunstein, supra note 47, at 1188
(noting that the perception of probability often turns on how readily a risk comes to mind).
135 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
PaationalityAssumption from Law and Economicas 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1088-89 (2000); see also
Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 466-67 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (outlining
a study showing participants' tendency to over or underestimate the number of deaths per year
due to different causes based largely on availability); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Scd. 1124, 1127-28 (1974).
136 See Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-
Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 98 (2005) (noting the use of availability by various
groups including terrorists to persuade people to believe risks are much higher than in reality);
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 691-98 (1999) (discussing the role of availability in the Love Canal environmental disaster
which lead to the creation of CERCLA).
137 This formula is another variant of the formula used by Knight to explain when social
actors will demand institutional change due to the presence of conflict. KNIGHT, supra note 34,
at 118.
138 See Joanna Burger, Conmon-Pool Resources and Commons Institutions, in PROTECTING
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
acid rain on the eastern seaboard before we understood the impact of coal-fired
power plants in the Midwest. 139 Second, costs begin accruing among uses even
before we recognize competing values. Consider the mining operations
throughout the American West that spread during the 1800s. Only a clairvoyant
could have foreseen how this use of public lands would later interfere with
recreational uses, such as skiing and hiking, or how it would impact future
settlement interests by contaminating ground water and decreasing slope
stability. Third, often the forums used to make decisions are not designed to
take into account conflicting values. Likewise, those pursuing conflicting uses
may be unfamiliar with the issues facing their counterparts.
Even when we recognize competing values, institutions often fail to take
into account conflicting values. In the rush to lock up the commons, users
neglect competing uses. For example, we pump groundwater and forget the
risks of surface subsidence or fill wetlands without taking into account their
benefits for flood protection. Additionally, when one set of users can export the
costs of their consumption to others, users may have little incentive to change.
To some degree, emerging commons are unavoidable: we are blinded by
the uncertainties, ignorance, and complexities. Still, when we do recognize
crowding, it can catalyze change because crowding tends to similarly impact
multiple, discrete users of the commons at once, which helps in mobilizing and
creating the will to seek change.
B. Recognizing Crowding
The earlier users recognize crowding, the more likely they will form
institutions to address it. As illustrated above, crowding among homogenous
users is generally more transparent than crowding among heterogeneous
uses. While understanding this dynamic is fundamental to understanding
emerging commons, it is not the only reason that crowding is more
transparent in some circumstances than in others.
A number of factors contribute to our ability to recognize crowding.
First, as compared to less consumptive uses, more consumptive uses can
create crowding with fewer users. Second, transparency of consumption
varies not only according to the use but also according to the technology
employed. For example, in the mining context, the mining implements
(shovels as opposed to steam shovels) and mining methods (open pit mining
as opposed to underground mining) influence the degree to which mining is
apparent. Third, the more users rely on and spend time using the commons,
the more likely it is that they will notice signs of crowding. Generally
speaking, this factor works to help those users with economic interests in
consuming the commons. Fourth, the less complex the use and the smaller
and simpler the dimensions of the commons, the more likely commons users
will notice crowding. Dimensions of a commons vary enormously: they may
THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 15, at 1,
10.
139 See Acid Rain in New England: A Brief History, http://www.epa.gov/regionOl/
eco/acidrain/history.htm1 (last visited July 17, 2007).
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be small like a bus bench or vast like the global atmosphere. Lastly,
complexity makes some types of consumption more apparent than others.
For example, it would be apparent if a boat attempted to tow away even a
sliver of an iceberg. 40 Yet, the massive consumption of the polar ice caps
arising from worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases went unnoticed for
decades.
These observations suggest that we would often expect to see
crowding-and related demands for protection of uses-when uses are
more consumptive, time consuming, and market-driven, and along smaller
dimensions of a commons. On the other hand, we do not see crowding as
effortlessly when uses are less consumptive, less time intensive, or in pursuit
of non-market values or when a commons has larger dimensions. Because
recognizing crowding almost always precedes building institutions, not
surprisingly, we often find that commons institutions favor those uses
noticed first. As discussed in the remainder of the Article, this has important
consequences.
V. TRAGIC INSTITUTIONS
Crowding drives institutional change in the commons and results in a
tendency of those building commons institutions to fixate on dimensions of the
commons experiencing crowding. Furthermore, to get commons users to
support these institutions, we often provide select users privileged access to the
commons and control over the governance of the institution. Additionally, we
build institutions to maximize stability. These generalizations characterize some
of the most substantial findings of the commons literature.
However, when the way we value the commons changes, stability loses
some of its sheen. With a change of circumstances, aspects of the commons we
previously neglected take on import. Where we find changing values,
institutions built to protect one value of the commons often stand in the way of
protecting competing values. Stability becomes rigidity: incumbent institutions
stand in the way of protecting emerging values.
This Part discusses institutional change and how incumbent institutions
create burdens for emerging values. Part V.A discusses the lack of attention paid
to institutional change in the commons scholarship. Part V.B discusses the main
factors driving tragic institutions. Part V.C puts forward a framework that
explains the interactions between stable institutions and emerging commons.
A. Relative Neglect of Institutional Change within the Commons Scholarship
Particularly in the context of changing values, institutional resistance to
change has received little attention in the commons literature.'4' This is a
140 In fact, even proposals to tow icebergs and use them for freshwater has received
attention for decades. See, e.g., Peter Gwyn et al., Antarctica ' Icy Assets, NEWSwEEK, Oct. 3,
1977, at 91.
141 Some authors exploring the challenge of solving the tragedy of the commons have
focused on path dependency. See LIBECAP, supra note 129, at 116.
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significant oversight. While attention to institutional change in the commons
literature is sparse, many commons scholars have made convincing
arguments to study institutional change. One of the most convincing came
from Dolak and Ostrom:
Most traditional common-pool resources have already been governed by one
regime or another .... The challenge in managing such resources is to devise
more effective institutions when the remnants of the previous regimes are still
present .... [and] to devise institutions that reallocate the common-pool
resources in the presence of political action by those who would lose in the
process of reallocation. 
142
While the commons literature generally neglects institutional change,
probably the most well known discourse is Ostrom's chapter on the subject
in Governing the Communons.1' 3 She observes that sometimes institutional
change comes easy while other times it is costly." She explains that
institutional change often occurs by adding layers of institutions "each
builft] on the base of prior rules."'45 While this glimpse of institutional
change begins to grapple with institutional inertia, unfortunately, Ostrom
leaves the topic almost as quickly as she raises it.
However, as a generalization, discussions of institutional change within
the comnmons literature are most notable for their absence rather than
contribution. This neglect leaves important stones unturned, such as the
importance of credible commitments in the literature. While commitments
help induce commons users to support commons institutions, commitments
providing select privileged access makes change difficult even when our
values evolve.
Moreover, the much acclaimed "design principles of enduring
institutions" often cut against protecting emerging commons. For example,
when institutions define who can use the commons and to what extent, this
predetermines winners and losers and makes institutional change difficult
unless it happens to benefit incumbent users. The same is true of giving
users control of the institutions that govern the commons. Additionally,
encouraging users to form user organizations creates social capital, which
can be used to rally incumbents to curtail change. 46
Even if the literature has ignored the issue of changing values, the
commons have not. Stability, of course, is important. However, this focus on
stability has made it all too easy to ignore the import of institutional
responsiveness. Our heavy investment in stability comes at a cost.
142 Dolak & Ostrom, supra note 121, at 3, 5-6.
143 See OSTROM, GOvERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 103-39.
144 Id. at 141.
145 Id
146 See Ostrom, Common-Property Insitutdons, supra note 44, at 293, 308-09; NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 112.
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B. Tragic Institutions
When emerging values cross the interests of incumbents, existing
institutions increase the costs of change or even prohibit change all together.
This grows out of four phenomena. First, those building institutions tend to
narrowly define a common's value-often protecting one value of a commons
at a time. As discussed above, this is often due to the role of crowding
influencing decisions to build institutions.14 Institutions provide a platform
for those with a stake in the commons to try to solidify why a commons has
value and who will benefit from it. Once created, commons institutions
entrench the interests pf those who create and maintain them.48
Second, we frequently engineer commons institutions to resist change. In
large part, this occurs due to the use of credible commitments to create
institutions: we promise select users privileged access to the commons to
induce their support.4 9 Once promised institutional advantages, commons
users generally use institutions to attempt to lock in privileged access, maling
it all but impossible to renege on these promises. 150 Incumbent users have
some power to both maintain their access to the commons and to fend off
change contrary to their interests.
Third, once the rules of the game are in place, those who benefit from the
incumbent institutions invest in political, economic, and social organizations
to protect their interests. 5' Not surprisingly, however, when emerging values
conflict with the interests of incumbent users, these organizations increase the
costs of change.
Lastly, some uses of the commons change the commons physically. When
a value calls for restoring a commons to how it was before, this is an
additional cost for those attempting to further emerging values. For example,
the consequences of surface mining, clear cutting forests, and bottom trawling
on the ocean's floor are often difficult to reverse. This equally applies to the
human-built landscape: each building and piece of infrastructure is costly to
remove or change. Sometimes, an emerging value calls for physical restoration
in addition to political engineering.
C. Tragic Institutions Tramework
How do existing commons institutions interact with efforts to protect
emerging dimensions of the commons? The answer to this question turns on
147 See supra Part IV.A.
148 See Martha E. Geores, The Relationship between Resource Definition and Scale:
Considerng the Fores4 in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note 63, at 77, 79.
149 See supra Part II.B.1.
150 See supra Part HI.A.
151 In contrast to institutions, organizations "are groups of individuals bound by some
common purpose to achieve objectives." NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 5; see also
KNIGHT, supra note 34, at 3. Organizations and institutions interact with each other and often
reinforce each other. See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 7; Elinor Ostrom, Community
and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 343, 348 (1992)
[hereinafter Ostrom, Solution ofCommons Problems].
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three factors: demands of those with a stake in the commons to pursue
institutional change or stability; the relative power of parties with an interest
in institutional change or stability; and the role of institutions in shaping
outcomes. So, we find the following relationship of factors influencing change:
Crowding x Power x Institutions
15 2
Similarly, the factors relating to stability include the following:
Conflict with Incumbents' Interests x Power x Institutions 153
Tragic institutions reflect the drag of the forces favoring stability on the
forces favoring change.
Each factor included in the framework deserves attention. First, the
inclusion of crowding and conflicts with incumbents' interests amplifies that
competition and conflict often explain institutional arrangements 54 and
reflects that parties use institutions to realize gains. 55 The demand for change
grows out of crowding, whereas the interests behind stability depends on
whether change impacts the interests of incumbents, including the benefits
they extract and the degree to which they control commons institutions. 5 In
determining the degree of conflict, the framework assumes the parties'
perceptions are what matter ignorance, uncertainty, and discounting may
alter an incumbent's assessment of the situation. 157
The framework takes a broad conception of the relative power of
incumbents and those pushing emerging values. Power comes from access to
wealth and resources, 158 political allies, ability to overcome collective action
problems, and from the physical traits of the commons. While most of these
factors are self explanatory, note that political allies might include those with
goals only tangentially related to the commons, such as building political
152 This framework is a variation of Plott's Equation: Preferences x Institutions = Outcomes.
See Charles R. Plott, Will Economics Become an Experimental Scienceg 57 S. ECON. J. 901, 905
(1991) (setting forth a simplified economic model of Preferences x Beliefs x Feasible Set x
Institutions = Outcomes, while cautioning that "[slimplicity should not be confused with
reality."); MELVIN J. HINICH & MICHAEL C. MUNGER, ANALYTICAL PoLrrCs 17 (1997) (calling Plott's
Equation the "fundamental equation of politics") (emphasis omitted).
153 See id
154 See KNIGHT, supra note 34, at 19; AGRAWAL, supra note 57, at 59-60; Demsetz, supra note
2, at 355; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organ&ation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 795 (1972); Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and
Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. EcON. 211, 211 (1950).
155 See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 86.
156 See LIBECAP, supra note 129, at 19-20.
157 See supra Part H.A.
158 See Robert A. Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, 52 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 462, 466
(1958); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 354 (1990) (observing that interest
groups "trade the votes of [their] members and [their] financial support... in exchange for an
implied promise of favorable legislation"); LIBECAP, supra note 129, at 17 (arguing that wealthier
interest groups are more effective lobbyists because they have at their disposal abundant
resources with which to garner political influence).
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constituencies1 59 or an interest reason to appease rent seekers. 60 As far as
overcoming collective action problems, this generally favors incumbents, who
have created organizations to pursue their shared political, economic, and
social interests.1"' But, collective action may also depend on other factors
such as group size, 62 availability of technology, 63 and leadership. 164 As far as
the physical characteristics of a commons, sometimes they favor one user
over another. For example, the upstream user of a river, can impact
downstream quantity and quality of water but not the other way around. 65
Similarly, decisions might have different impacts at different geographic
scales. For example, local government land use policy is often seen as
contributing to regional urban sprawl.166 The decision that serves local
interests presumably best then often cuts against regional interests.
Finally, institutions can also impact outcomes in several ways. First,
institutional inertia can complicate efforts to bring about change. 67 This often
159 See DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 10 (1990); Arthur T. Denzau
& Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get
Represented, 80 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 89, 90 (1986).
160 Rent seeking does not expand the pie, rather it redistributes it. See POSNER, supra note
34, at 9-11, 37 n.3; James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY
OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980). Government rents can
come in many forms but might include exclusive access to particular benefits, tariffs that
restrict competitors, lax enforcement, entitlements, and subsidies. See William C. Mitchell &
Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL.
ScI. 512, 525 (1991). Rent seekers often overuse the commons. See MICHAEL ROSS, TIMBER
BOOMS AND INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 3-5 (2001); YOUNG, supra note 30, at
72-74, 79-80 (discussing rent-seekers' tendency to "rape, ruin, and run") (citation omitted);
Fikret Berkes, Marine Coastal Fisheries in Turkey, in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY
PRACTICE, AND POLICY, supra note 20, at 161, 175.
161 See supra Parts H.C & V.B; Demsetz, supra note 2, at 357; OLSON, supra note 48, at 27.
162 See supra Part H.C.
16 See LIBECAP, supra note 129, at 16 (identifying changes in enforcement technology as a
motivating factor for individuals to contract to change property rights); Anderson & Hill, supra
note 123.
164 See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (discussing policy entrepreneurs); NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note
34, at 87 (discussing "trade associations, lobbying groups, [and] political action committees");
LIBECAP, supra note 129 at 16-17, 27-28 (discussing politicians and bureaucrats); Stigler, supra
note 73, at 3-4 (discussing interest groups); DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY: NETWORKS, REPUTATIONS AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 1862-1928,
at 353 (2001) (discussing agency officials); Denzau & Munger, supra note 159, at 90 (discussing
legislators).
165 See ERIKA WEINTHAL, STATE MAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: LINKING DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 35-36 (2002); John P. Dwyer, The Role of State
Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 223 (1997) (discussing bargaining power of downwind and downstream
states).
166 See Robert E. Burchel & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the
Uited States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 139-40 (1999); William W. Buzbee,
Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57,
92-94 (1999); Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone
Astray? 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 345, 378 (1997); Peter D. Salins, Metropolitan
Visions, 26 REASON 60, 60 (Dec. 1994).
167 See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 112; Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
means that incremental change is the dominate form of institutional change. 168
As mentioned previously, this is only compounded by the fact that commons
institutions are often designed to resist change.' 69 Second, uncertainty over
institutions deters those seeking change and emboldens those committed to
the status quo. 70 Third, institutions provide tools that can often be useful in
-fending off change and sometimes useful in promoting it.' 7' These tools might
come in the form of legally enforceable rights or other mechanisms to draw on
government enforcement. 172 Lastly, changing some aspects of institutions may
be more difficult than others. 73 We would expect those pursuing new values
to look to the least costly way of achieving change.174
VI. FROM THEORY TO APPLICATION
So far, this Article has focused much on theory. This Part attempts to
root this discussion in three real world examples. The examples were
selected because they provide useful vantage points to examine tragic
institutions. Additionally, the diversity of the examples underscores the
broad applicability of the theory to real-world situations.
We begin with the past century's incremental change of the United
States' approach to the analog radio spectrum. The second case looks at the
first decades of Yellowstone National Park, and how the creation of a park
supplanted other users of Yellowstone, specifically uses by Native
Americans, fur trappers, and entrepreneurs. The final case explores western
water law in the context of the changing West.
QWERT, 75 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 1985, 332, 333; OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS, supra note 2, at 141; Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, Pragmatism, and a
Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CI. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000)
(asserting that law venerates and depends on the past).
168 See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 89 (arguing incremental change the "most
important point" in understanding institutional change); Charles Lindblom, The Science of
"Muddling Through", 19 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 86 (1959) (noting public policy can limit risk
though incremental change); LIBECAP, supra note 129, at 116.
169 See supra Part III and V.B.
170 See Oran R. Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes 36
INT'L ORG. 277, 280 (1982); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equlibrium
I/stitudo.s, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 51 (Herbert F. Weisberg ed.,
1986) (asserting that fear of upsetting the status quo "is the characteristic feature of politics").
171 See LIBECAP, supra note 129, at 18-19.
172 Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchunarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 321 n.269 (2001); Michael S.
Greve, The Private Enforcement of Enironmental Law, 65 TUIL L. REV. 339, 339 (1990)
173 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 52 (discussing hierarchy of rules).
174 See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 67; WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 1; R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the flrm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937); George A. Akerlof, The Market for
Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488, 488 (1970).
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A. Case Studies
1. Bringing the Radio Spectrum into the Infomiation Age
The radio spectrum is a classic commons: users are difficult to deter and
too much use of a frequency jams the air waves.175 Time has brought
enormous challenges to accommodate innovative uses of the spectrum.
The beginning of the twentieth century saw a growing number of ships at
sea begin to use the spectrum for Morse code messages. I7 6 However, as more
and more used the air waves, we began to see congestion. This congestion
received much attention in 1912, as the result of communication problems
surrounding the sinking of the Titanic."v The most publicized of these was the
garbling of two unrelated messages from two ships that resulted in the
misimpression that the Titanic was safely being towed to Halifax. 178
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1912,179 which
charged the Secretary of Commerce with some responsibility to license use of
the spectrum.8 0 In substantial part, the Act relied on a first-in-time, first-in-
right allocation of licenses. 181
However, Congress's solution did not foresee that by the 1920s voice
radio would come to dominate the spectrum.' 2 As this became clear, then-
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover attempted to use the Radio Act to
facilitate the growth of commercial broadcast radio by reservng more
desirable parts of the spectrum for commercial broadcast, relegating amateur
radio to less desirable segments, and even providing protections for
incumbent broadcasters from interference from others. 183
The popularity of radio grew, the waves were saturated, and in 1925,
Hoover stopped issuing new licenses. 8" But, in 1926, a federal court ruled that
175 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
176 Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environmen; 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 299 (1998). Due to the import and prospect
of crowding, the U.S. Navy advocated regulation of the spectrum and even made some attempts
to appropriate it for its use. Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Comnission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 2. (1959); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 135 (1990) [hereinafter Hazlett, The Rationality of US.
Regulation].
177 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLIcY 16 (2d ed. 2006).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 17; Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 269, 281 n.33 (2004); Benkler, supra note 176, at 301; Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37
Stat. 302 (1912).
180 See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 177, at 19.
181 Thomas W. Hazlett, AssigwMg Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users. Why Did FCC
License Actions Take 67 Years 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 532 (1998) [hereinafter Hazlett, Assigning
Property Rights]; Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation, supra note 176, at 136.
182 See Benkler, supra note 176, at 308 (outlining the "blossoming" of radio during the 1920s);
Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation, supra note 176, at 139-41.
183 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 177, at 18; Benkler, supra note 176, at 309-10; Hazlett, The
Ratonality of US. Regulation, supra note 176, at 152-58.
184 Benider, supra note 176, at 310.
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Hoover had no authority to stop.185 So, in the summer of 1926, Hoover began
reissuing licenses, and within several months more than two hundred new
radio stations made their way onto the air waves. 86 However, with so many
stations on air, "nobody could be heard.""8 ' This represented the second radio
tragedy of the commons in as many decades.
In February 1927, Congress responded to public outcry concerning the
overcrowded spectrum and passed the Radio Act of 1927.1'8 The Act in
significant part parroted the scheme put forward by Hoover'8 9 with one
important caveat-it cut Hoover out of the picture and created the Federal
Radio Commission,1 " later to become the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).
In large part, the Radio Act of 1927 established several rules that have
largely shaped regulation of the spectrum to the present.' 91 First, the Act
presumed that the government owned the spectrum and that ownership would
not change hands. 92 Second, those administering the Federal Radio Act would
not charge licensees for their use of the spectrum.1 93 Rather, licensees "paid
for" their use of the spectrum by adhering to government dictates and
facilitating activities that were thought to have benefited the public (e.g.,
airing of children's programming and political debates). 94 Third, the Act gave
much discretion to the implementing agency, only requiring that the agency's
regulation conform to the amorphous "public interest." 195 Fourth, the Act
protected licensees from interference from others.'96
With time, these institutions became entrenched. Why?
First and foremost, the government did not relinquish its ownership claim
and incumbents have worked hard to maintain their privileged access. This is
hardly surprising, as the radio spectrum is an increasingly scarce and valuable
commodity.
185 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. II. 1926); See also Hazlett, The
Rationality of US. Regulation, supra note 176, at 141 (analyzing United States v. Zenith Radio
Corp.).
186 Benkler, supm note 176, at 299.
187 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
188 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-84, 85, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102 (repealed 1934); id. §§ 84a-84b, 80
Stat. 647 (repealed 1966). See also Hazlett, The Rational'ty of US. Regulation, supra note 176, at
141.
189 Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation, supra note 176, at 166.
190 Benlder, supra note 176, at 314.
191 Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation, supra note 176, at 136; Benkler, supra note
176, at 299.
192 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). See also Goodman, supra note 179, at 286-87 (describing the Act's
specific denial of ownership rights to licensees).
193 This point has largely captured the interest-if not the ire-of many. See Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, supra note 176, at 25-26; Hazlett, Assigning Prop'erty
Rtights, supra note 181, at 534-35, Table 2.
194 See Hazlett, AssgningPropertyRght, supra note 181, at 545, 566.
195 BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 177, at 23; Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation, supra
note 176, at 136.
196 See FED. RADIO COMM'N, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (1929); Hazlett, The Rationality of US. Regulation, supra
note 176, at 167; Goodman, supra note 179, at 310, 340-46.
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Second, Congress and the FCC have developed strong relationships with
incumbent users. Incumbents solidified their relationship with regulators by
attempting to comply with federal mandates and goals. In a more cynical light,
relationships have strengthened due to intelligent lobbying.9 7 The National
Association of Broadcasters has made itself into a substantial political force in
Washington, D.C.' While perhaps somewhat overstated, many commentators
have claimed that the broadcasters have "captured" the FCC.'99 Regardless,
leaving so much discretion in the hands of the FCC at least made it an
attractive target for rent seeking. 200
Despite--or some might argue because of-the broad "public interest"
standard and the federal government's position that it owns the spectrum,
incumbent users have become entrenched political winners: the FCC almost
always renews and almost never revokes licenses.2 1'
Over the past fifteen years, we have seen much innovation and increasing
public demand for new technologies reliant on the spectrum--cellular phones,
WiFi, and palm pilots. Of course, all of this demand comes in a context where
the Internet, cable television, and satellite television and radio have arguably
made broadcast uses of the spectrum relatively less important than they once
were. Society's changing values with regards to the spectrum provides some
interesting insights into how institutional inertia in the commons bumps up
against the demands of a dynamic world.
Consider three different examples that illustrate efforts to take into
account the escalating demand for new technologies where incumbents have
increased the costs of change--often resulting in complaints that change came
too slowly and in too small of quantities.2"2 First, historically, licensees have
not paid for their use of the spectrum. Yet, in the 1990s, we saw a great deal of
pressure to rely on auctions rather than comparative hearings.20 3 For the
197 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private
and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2007, 2045-50 (2003) (detailing lobbying efforts); Hazlett,
The Rationality of US Regulation, supra note 176, at 168-69 (discussing "quid-pro-quo"
arrangements); Hazlett, Assjing Property Rights, supra note 181, at 546 (discussing benefits
such as favorable publicity and campaign donations).
198 See Louis Jacobson & Bara Vaida, Broadcast Blues, 35 NAT'L J. 2560, 2560 (2003) (calling
the National Association of Broadcasters a "lobbying juggernaut"); Alicia Mundy, Big John
Takes Charge, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 16, 1996, at 17, 20 (calling the National Association of
Broadcasters "one of the most powerful influences here in Washington").
199 See Wendy M. Rogovin, The Regulation of Television in the Public Interest: On Creating a
Parallel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and Are Heard, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 70 n.68
(1992); Ralph Nader & Claire Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A Broadcast Network for the
Audience, 5 J.L. & POL. 1, 66-67 (1988).
200 See Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights, supra note 181, at 561; Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 591 (1988); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern
Jurisprudence and the Problem ofAdministrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646, 649 (1988).
201 See Hazlett, Assigzing Property Rights, supra note 181, at 553; David Bazelon, The First
Amendment and the "New Media "-New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, in FREE
BUT REGULATED: CONFLICTING TRADITIONS IN MEDIA LAW 52, 55 (Daniel L. Brenner & William L.
Rivers eds., 1982).
202 See, eg, Goodman, supra note 179, at 312-14 (describing some of the complaints with
the FCC in making spectrum allocation decisions).
203 See id at 306; Benkler, supra note 176, at 318.
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most part, this pressure arose from the Clinton Administration's attempt to
reduce the federal deficit. 4 Not surprisingly, incumbent licensees cringed at
the idea of paying for licenses and lobbied against the proposed auctions.0"
The political compromise reached made auctions only applicable to new
licenses and not renewals.0 ' Still, supporters of the bill had to stomach key
members of Congress adding a number of pork barrel projects before it
could pass.2
0 7
Second, in the 1990s, Congress attempted to begin relocating broadcast
television from the analog radio spectrum to the digital bandwidth.
2°1
Obviously, this transfer would free up much space on the analog
spectrum.20 9 Not surprisingly, broadcast television wanted to claim space on
the digital spectrum-where broadcast quality could improve dramatically-
but resisted giving up privileged access to the analog spectrum. Again,
Congress settled this matter by striking a compromise. First, Congress gave
broadcasters access to the digital spectrum without charge.210 Second,
Congress pushed off the date broadcasters would have to surrender the
analog spectrum to December 31, 2006,211 later postponed again until
February 2009.212 Third, Congress provided a loophole: even after
broadcasters transferred to the digital spectrum, they would still have access
to the analog spectrum until at least eighty-five percent of the market
affected had access to digital television.21 1 Many commentators suspect that
this eighty-five percent threshold will mean that broadcast television will
hold its claim to the analog spectrum longer than the 2009 cutoff date.214
Until the eviction, broadcasters can use both the analog and digital
spectrums.
204 See Hazlett, AsslwingPropertyRifghts, supra note 181, at 562-63.
205 See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bdging Divides: The Failure and
Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 1, 7-8
(2004); Hazlett, AssigningPropertyRights, supra note 181, at 561.
206 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(1), (2)(b) (2000); Hazlett, Assigning
Property Rights, supra note 181, at 535; see also Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, NEW
REPUBULC, May 5, 1997, at 20 (calling this the "lobbying coup of the decade").
207 Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights, supra note 181, at 562-63. Some of the line items
prompted President Clinton to at least attempt to exercise the line item veto. See City of New
York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 171-73 (D.D.C. 1998), afld, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
208 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3003, 111 Stat. 251, 265-66 (1997)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309U)(14)(B) (2000)). See also Goodman, supra note 179, at
343.
209 Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau, Digital Television (DTV): FCC Consumer
Facts, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/digitaltv.html (last visited July 15, 2007).
210 47 U.S.C. § 336(a). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest; 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 499, 503 (2000).
211 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3003, 111 Stat. 251, 265 (1997)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A)).
212 Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-171, § 3002,
120 Stat. 21 (2006) (codified as amended in various sections of 47 U.S.C.).
213 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3003, 111 Stat. 251 at 265-66 (1997)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(B)(iii)).
214 See, e.g., Angela J. Campbell, A Public Interest Perspective on the Impact of the
Broadcasting Provisions of the 1996Act; 58 FED. Comm. L.J. 455, 458-59 (2006).
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Third, in 1997, the FCC issued an order that created what it called the
"Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure." 2 5 This order increased
access to the spectrum of wireless technologies by allowing them to use the
spectrum, so long as they did not interfere with incumbents' use.216 Technical
innovations designed to minimize interference made it possible for wireless
technologies to utilize this leeway.217 Of course, incumbents did not enjoy the
prospect of additional competition but could not complain too loudly because
the rights of these users were qualified to the extent that impinged on
incumbents' licensed use. While many unlicensed users have found at least
temporary relief by this order, some have voiced concerns that incumbents
have no incentive to make themselves less prone to interference and-in
fact-may intentionally make themselves more prone to interference to keep
out competitors. 218 Additionally, this liberalization of the spectrum only
applies to small niches of the spectrum, leaving most of the spectrum as is. 219
How does this narrative relate to the framework discussed in Part V? In
answering this question, it is necessary to compare the factors that promote a
resolution that favor incumbents (i.e., crowding, power, and institutions) with
that of factors that favor rivals (i.e., the degree of conflict between the new
value and incumbents, power, and institutions).
Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, we see crowding but not
necessarily the need to exclude many users of the spectrum: with some
organization the spectrum could facilitate that time's major use of the
spectrum, Morse code. As broadcast radio and then television came onto the
scene, it became much more important for users of the commons to lock in
their gains and seek protection from rival users. This translated into individual
and collective efforts to lobby the federal government for a stable right to the
spectrum. This pressure along with the public import of broadcast radio and
television helped bolster incumbents' claims to the spectrum. The institutions
did much to favor broadcasters. However, spectrum institutions did not
explicitly give incumbents long-term, secure access to the commons: to get
this sort of access, incumbents invested a great deal of effort in appeasing and
lobbying the federal government.
Overtime, incumbents increased their power and tightened their grip of
the commons as they secured a place of prominence in American culture.
215 Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed NIL
Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576 (1997) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2 & 15).
216 Id. See also Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum As a Ffit
Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2002) (stating that the FCC has allowed flexible uses,
not requiring a license on high-frequency bands); Benkler, supra note 176, at 294 (describing
unlicensed transmission); Kevin Werbach, Supercoinmons: Toward a Unified Theory of
Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 947 (2004) (describing the FCC's interference
proposal, which would define peak noise floor levels and allow unlicensed devices to operate
below this floor).
217 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 221-22 (2001); Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 25, 78-80 (2002).
218 See, e.g, Goodman, supra note 179, at 301 n.96; Benkler, supra note 176, at 339.
219 BENJAMIN, ET AL, supra note 177, at 11.
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Additionally, it became increasingly clear to political actors that broadcasters
served an important role in politics. Broadcasters had the ability to finesse the
news of the day and to shine the spotlight-either to enhance or to tarnish-
on political actors. At the same time, broadcasters had amassed a robust
lobbying apparatus to protect their interests. So, by the time rivals users who
wanted to use the spectrum for wireless came on the scene, broadcasters had
developed a great deal of power and created much security in their continued
right to use the spectrum.
Still, the rival use of the spectrum for wireless devices only grew at the
tail end of the twentieth century. Increasingly, society demanded and in fact
relied upon wireless devices. At the same time, the importance of broadcast
media perhaps began to wane as alternatives to broadcasters reliant on the
spectrum made headway on media other than broadcast television, such as
the Internet, cable, and satellite. Still, in significant part incumbent users
withstood rival interests.
Yet, in the 1990s, rivals received a significant boost as the Clinton
administration and members of Congress came to link the use of the spectrum
commons with a political strategy to help reduce the federal deficit.
In the end, even with the institutional advantages and. significant power
that incumbents enjoyed, it was not enough to keep new rivals out of the
spectrum commons. But, rivals did not get everything that they wanted, and
incumbents were able to cut .their losses. As the framework would suggest,
this occurred by incumbents finding ways to allow rivals access to the
commons while at the same time minimizing conflict with their own claims.
Specifically, the new rules only opened limited parts of the spectrum to rivals,
incumbents did not have to pay for their continued use whereas rivals had to
pay to access the spectrum, and rivals were barred from interfering with
incumbent users. Additionally, broadcasters received a carrot in form of free
access to the digital spectrum to compensate them for losses that they might
accrue to accommodate rival uses.
2. Creation of Yellowstone National Park and the Eviction of I'storic Users
Yellowstone National Park is among the world's most celebrated
commons. Its national park status only dates back to 1872, but people have
used and enjoyed Yellowstone for much longer. While visitors today may see
Yellowstone---despite its persistent flow of traffic-as nature untamed, for
centuries before Yellowstone became a park, it was a place where people
hunted and even lived. The coming of the park closed an era for Native
Americans and fur trappers. Yet, these established uses did not fade away
the moment that President Grant signed the bill that made Yellowstone a
national park. Even though the federal government was much more
powerful than these traditional users, rooting them out took decades.
Most retellings of how Yellowstone became a national park begin with
events that occurred in 1870 specifically surrounding a small group of
influential citizens of Montana. These Montanans took at trip to what is now
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called Yellowstone National Park to verify what they had heard about
Yellowstone from trappers and miners.220 As they toured Yellowstone, they
not only saw many natural wonders but also an opportunity to bring the area
the railroad, tourists, and an infusion of money.221 While the actual
motivations spurring their actions remain unclear,222 the group determined
to spread excitement about the natural wonders they saw on their trip.22
3
Shortly after their trip, Nathaniel Langford (later to become the first
superintendent of Yellowstone) convinced Jay Cooke, president of the
Northern Pacific Railroad, to support efforts to protect and promote
Yellowstone as a way to further investment in his railroad. 224 Then, on the
railroad's dime, Langford made his way to Washington, D.C. to tell those in
-the government what his group saw in Yellowstone. 225 Among those who met
Langford was Dr. Ferdinand Hayden of the U.S. Geological Survey.226
Hayden was enthralled with what he heard and successfully lobbied several
members of Congress to fund him to complete a survey of Yellowstone. 227
When Hayden later returned to Washington, overwhelmed with the majesty
of Yellowstone, he brought with him photographs, sketches, and the
scientific credibility to help lobby for Yellowstone's protection.22 His trip
also documented some commercial exploitation of the area: during his
journey he ran across a number of entrepreneurs attempting to profit from
the "healing waters" of Yellowstone.229 Additionally, upon returning, he
found a letter on his desk from Cooke's company encouraging Hayden to
lobby to protect Yellowstone. 23 °
Langford, Hayden, and the Northern Pacific Railroad joined forces and
lobbied Congress to make Yellowstone a national park.23l The prospect that
entrepreneurial efforts might somehow ruin Yellowstone's beauties became
the sounding bell for action-the tragedy of the commons spotted far on the
horizon. Congressional debate went briskly. The bill to create the park
passed easily-though Congress appropriated little money to fulfill its
220 See MARK DANIEL BARRINGER, SELLING YELLOWSTONE: CAPITALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF NATURE 12 (2002) ("The trappers' tales of the place 'where Hell bubbled up' circulated
widely."); CHRIS J. MAGOC, THE CREATION AND SELLING OF AN AMERICAN LANDSCAPE, 1870-1903 2
(1999); PAUL SCHULLERY, SEARCHING FOR YELLOWSTONE: ECOLOGY AND WONDER IN THE LAST
WILDERNESS 51 (1997).
221 See BARRINGER, supra note 220, at 14; MAGOC, supra note 220, at 9; STEPHEN GERMIC,
AMERICAN GREEN: CLASS, CRISIS, AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF NATURE IN CENTRAL PARK, YOSEMITE,
AND YELLOWSTONE 85-86 (2001).
222 See PAUL SCHULLERY & LEE WHIrrLESEY, MYTH AND HISTORY IN THE CREATION OF
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK 1-34 (2003).
223 See BARRINGER, supra note 220, at 14; SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 59.
224 SCHULLERY & WHITTLESEY, supra note 222, at 31.
225 Id
226 BARRINGER, supr note 220, at 14; MAGOC, supra note 220, at 14-15; SCHULLERY, supra note
220, at 60.
227 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 45-47.
228 BARRINGER, supra note 220, at 14-15; MAGOC, supra note 220, at 15.
229 BARRINGER, Supra note 220, at 16.
230 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 60; MAGOC, supra note 220, at 17.
231 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 60-61; DAVID RAINS WALLACE, YELLOWSTONE: OFFICIAL
NATIONAL PARK HANDBOOK 48-49 (2000).
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mandate.23 2 By March 1, 1872, Present Grant signed the legislation into
law.=3 The Act declared Yellowstone "a public park or pleasuring-ground for
the benefit and enjoyment of the people" and instructed the Secretary of the
Interior to protect the park's wildlife.23
In charting the course for Yellowstone, it appears that Congress showed
little or no concern for those who then-currently used Yellowstone. If
anything, action was furthered-not set back-by these users, particularly
the entrepreneurs attempting to profit from Yellowstone. And, throughout
Congress's proceedings, it appears virtually no thought was given to the long
established stakes of the Shoshoni, Crow, Blackfeet, Flathead, Kootenai,
Bannock, and Nez Perce tribes or to the trappers who regularly hunted in
Yellowstone.
2 35
Despite the power and resources of the federal government, creation
of a national park did not immediately change things on the ground. The
next several decades were characterized by the federal government's
attempts to remove the Native Americans, trappers, and unauthorized
entrepreneurs from the park.2 36 So, even in this case, the drag of
institutions of the past increased the cost of change.
The most senior users of the parks received the most hostile ejection
from Yellowstone. Native Americans, who had been using the park for
centuries, 237 for the most part tried to avoid tourists.238 However, in the
early years of the national park, several bloody confrontations departed
from this generalization, most notably an infamous 1877 attack by Nez
Perce Indians.2 39 In 1879, the park superintendent "removed" all Native
Americans from Yellowstone, 24 0 which even though in many ways
ineffectual, seemed to help lure in more tourists.2 41 However, while the
park management made some efforts to forcibly evict the Native
Americans, this campaign was not successful in the most frequented parts
of the park until near the end of the nineteenth century when the United
States Army built a fort in Mammoth Hot Springs.2 42
The creation of Yellowstone may have accompanied a mandate to
evict trappers, yet initially, park management lacked the tools required to
accomplish this task. In fact, in the years following the creation of the
232 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 61.
233 Yellowstone National Park Protection Act, ch. 24, sec. 1, 17 Stat. 32 (1872).
234 Id
235 PETER NABOKOV & LAWRENCE LOENDORF, RESTORING A PRESENCE 38-39 (2004); MARK
DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS 45-49 (1999); GERMIC, supra note 221, at 94.
236 BARRINGER, sup!' note 220, at 19-33; SPENCE, supra note 235, at 61.
237 WALLACE, supra note 231, at 39-41; SPENCE, supra note 235, at 43; GERMIC, supra note 221,
at 94; SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 8-11.
238 GERMIC, supra note 221, at 93-94.
239 BARRINGER, supra note 220, at 18-19; WALLACE, supra note 231, at 41; SPENCE, supra note
235, at 56; MAGOC, supra note 220, at 5; SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 105.
240 BARRINGER, supra note 220, at 19.
241 Id. at 20; NABOKOV & LOENDORF, supra note 235, at xi; WALLACE, supra note 231, at 50-51,
107; SPENCE, supra note 235, at 56-58.
242 SPENCE, supra note 235, at 56-57; SCHULLERY, supm note 220, at 112.
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park, hunting increased tremendously, 24 almost obliterating Yellowstone's
bison herd. This resulted in outrage from the press, the general public, and
many sportsmen.244 The boiling point came in 1894 when park management
caught a poacher with several bison pelts within the park boundaries. 45
After media and public outcry, Congress passed the Lacey Act,246 which
provided park management tools to curb hunting, including the ability to
fine and imprison violators. 247 Granted, the bison decline did not end
immediately.248 But, with this hefty tool and the assistance of the United
States Army to enforce it, hunting began to disappear from Yellowstone. 241
However, this was not enough to save the bison. Ultimately, park managers
turned their attention to exterminating predators, particularly wolves,250
and to introducing domesticated bison to the park.
25
'
While ridding the park of entrepreneurs may have helped inspire the
creation of Yellowstone, it took time. Once it occurred, it was more of an
exchange than an eviction. The creation of the park only increased the
desires of speculators to use the park. Still, with time, park management
managed to evict those entrepreneurs that had "illegitimate" stakes in
Yellowstone.2 52 However, ouster of these was followed by installation of
"legitimate" entrepreneurs who had the support of park management . 2 1 In
fact, one entrepreneur early in the park's history convinced park
management to give him substantial portions of Mammoth Hot Springs-
something that was later invalidated by Congress. 2 4 As the twentieth
century came, and the park was firmly implanted, the most influential
entrepreneurial interests were aligned with the railroads, which competed
fiercely to provide concessions, road transportation, and lodging.2 55
Turning to the framework, again it is necessary to compare the factors
that promote a resolution that favor incumbents (i.e., crowding, power,
and institutions) with that of factors that favor rivals (i.e., the degree of
conflict between the new value and incumbents, power, and institutions).
At first blush it might seem surprising that for decades, incumbent users-
the Native Americans, trappers, and early entrepreneurs-withstood the
federal government's attempt to expel them from Yellowstone. Yet, the
framework helps expose why incumbents had the foothold they did.
243 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 74-75; WALLACE, supra note 231, at 64-65.
244 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 74-75.
245 SPENCE, supra note 235, at 65; WALLACE, supra note 231, at 65; SCHULLERY, supra note 220,
at 121.
246 Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2000)).
247 See MAGOC, supra note 220, at 160.
248 Id
249 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 121.
250 WALLACE, supra note 231, at 65.
251 SCHULLERY, supra note 220, at 121.
252 BARRINGER, supra note 220, at 24.
253 Id.
254 Id at 27-28.
255 Id at 23-40; WALLACE, supra note 231, at 56-57.
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
The law passed by Congress and the informal institutions that had
created patterns of use of the park over a long period of time were
unavoidably at odds with each other. This stark clash of institutions put in
place a clash between incumbent and rival users. While a decree in
Washington D.C. did not automatically alter the incumbents' use of
Yellowstone, the federal government's track record in the nineteenth
century showed that it had the ability to remove Native Americans-the
most substantial group of incumbents-when those in power determined to
do so.
So, how were incumbents able to remain in Yellowstone as long as they
did? The answer to this differs across incumbent users. For the incumbent
entrepreneurs-the entities Congress focused upon when making
Yellowstone into a national park-their staying power is largely a reflection
in the time lag between Congress making Yellowstone a park and federal
land mangers and rival entrepreneurs getting a foothold in Yellowstone.
Until this occurred, at least in a limited way rivals and incumbent
entrepreneurs had a manageable-and perhaps at times even a symbiotic-
relationship. This, of course, changed as rival entrepreneurs got a stronger
foothold within the park and made headway with park management. This
ultimately lead to the eviction of incumbent entrepreneurs.
What about the trappers and the Native Americans? As mentioned in
the context of discussing the framework, sometimes the physical traits of
the commons favors one user over another. This plays out here. Even with
the federal government promoting tourism, Yellowstone was big enough for
hunters and Native Americans to find plenty of places where tourists did not
frequent much. Unlike the entrepreneurs, these incumbents had the ability
to relocate quite easily. So, even though these incumbents would have
noticed conflicts between their traditional use and the desires to make
Yellowstone a national park, from the incumbents' perspective they still had
ample opportunities to use the commons as they desired. For the federal
government to close off the commons to these incumbent users, it took a
great deal of effort and resources: the extended attention and presence of
the United States Army within the park.
So, despite what seems an obvious advantage in the power to call upon
resources, rivals had to make significant commuitments to transform
Yellowstone from a place that people had used for centuries to the desired
facade that Yellowstone was nature untouched. While here too, rivals users
prevailed, the ability of incumbents to hold on as long as they did shows the
staying power of institutions.
3. Western Water Law and the Changing West
Major water bodies are a quintessential commons resources.256 In the arid
interior of the western United States, they are also very important commons
256 Edela Schlager, Water Resources: The Southwestern United States, in PROTECTING THE
COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICA, supra note 15, at 133-36.
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resources: lack of water defines the West's natural and built landscapes.157 Not
surprisingly, water proved paramount as settlers attempted to move into the
interior West. In the modem West--one of the fastest growing areas of the
United States-the thirst for water only grows.2" Despite all the changes the
West has seen over the past 150 years, the rules allocating water have hardly
changed at all.
Before the emergence of western water law, however, history reflects that
water was a source of great uneasiness and conflict: hoarding, diversions, and
even. out-and-out brawls. In fact, all this caused Mark Twain to purportedly
observe: "In the west, whiskey is for drinkin' and water is for fightin'."259
Uncertainty over water made it difficult to settle in the West and added a barrier
to entice settlers and investors239-in other words, a tragedy of the commons.
Not surprisingly, given the importance of water, western settlers attempted
to close off access by creating commons institutions. These institutions began
as informal norms among the settlers and boiled down to two simple principles.
First, seniority mattered: first ma time, first in right.2 6' Second, water users had to
put water to a continued "beneficial use."262 The concept of beneficial use has
two parts: a prohibition against waste and a requirement that water users had to
use their claims on a continual basis,263 both making it more difficult to hold
water for speculative purposes.
257 See WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS 46 (1992)
("Aridity, more than anything else, gives the western landscape its character."); MARC REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 1-14 (1993) (detailing the
western history of water and its effects on habitation).
258 See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 12-13 (3d ed. 2000); Holly
Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West 72 U. COLO. L. REV.
361, 363 (2001); John D. Leshy, Shaping the Modem West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 287, 301 (2001).
259 See Sandra Postel, The Looming Water Wars.. Farms vs. Cities, USA TODAY, Mar. 2000
(attributing quotation to Twain, although worded differently: "whiskey's for drinking, water's
for fighting about"). However, while this quotation is attributed to Twain, it is not clear that he
actually said it.
260 See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 24 (5th ed. 2002); WILLIAM
GOLDFARB, WATER LAw 15 (1984); Jennie L. Bricker and David E. Filippi, Endangered Species
Act Enforcement and Western Water Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 735, 737 (2000). See generaLly Charles F.
Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v, v-ix (1991) (explaining
the growth of the "prior appropriation" doctrine in the West).
261 See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 9-
10 (2nd ed. 1991).
262 See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.260(3) (2006) (defining "beneficial use" as "a use of water
for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons or the public, that is reasonable and consistent
with the public interest"); CAL WATER CODE § 1240 (West 1971) (explaining that appropriation
"must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in
interest ceases to use it for such a purpose the right ceases"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4)
(2006) (defining "[b]eneficial use"); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.002 (4) (Vernon 2006)
(providing the Texas definition).
263 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.035 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (West 1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(c) (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 42-104 (2003); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water
Law, 61 U. COLO. L. 257, 260 (1990); Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law. A Blueprint
for Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483, 499 (1982).
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These simple institutions served nineteenth century settlers and their
time well. They provided settlers with the certainty they desired, allowed
for increased investment in the West, and provided a system that helped the
West grow and flourish.264
As such, it is not surprising to find that western society invested
resources to help bolster and entrench these rules. In fact, every settler
who had a place in line arguably had an interest to assure that the
institution translated into a right to use water. Additionally, the settlers'
shared stake in the rules helped spur collective action: water user
organizations built irrigations ditches and devoted resources to monitor the
resource and its users. Social organizations bolstered the institutions. For
example, the Mormon Church-which helped settle hundreds of
communities throughout the West-not only encouraged members of the
community to honor the rules but even enforced water rules in
ecclesiastical courts.
265
Significantly, these institutions found the support of state and
territorial governments. As early as the 1850s, state courts began to rely on
the settlers' rules as the common law. Legislatures soon followed and made
common law statutory law. By the beginning of the twentieth century, most
states west of the Mississippi had formed administrative agencies to
administer the rnles, to keep track of the seniority of different users, and to
consider applications by those who wanted a place at the back of the line.
State governments became western water's line monitors. For the past
century, these institutions also received tremendous support from the
federal government, which has invested billions of dollars to dam and
distribute western water.266
While things may look fine from the perspective of incumbents, as the
queue for water has only grown, the rationales for the West's water
institutions have become increasingly tenuous. This is true particularly in
light of the changing face of the West: once home to sparsely populated
agrarian communities but now increasingly populated by urbanites and
suburbanites. 267
Consider three examples of how institutions governing the water
commons have stood in the way of changing values held by much of the
changing West. While eighty to ninety percent of the inhabitants of the
western United States live in urban areas-such as Phoenix, Los Angeles,
Denver, Salt Lake City, and Las Vegas-approximately eighty to ninety
264 See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983).
265 See EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE-CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900 314-21 (1988).
266 See, e.g., David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Poicy: Have Federal
Laws andLocal Decisions Eclipsed the States'Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11 (2001); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., What Good is Economics?, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 175, 181 (2003).
.267 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY: CENSUS 2000
SPECIAL REPORTS 43 (2002) (noting the dramatic increase in the population living in
metropolitan areas in the West); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 139 (1985); Timothy Egan, Get Used to New West, Land
Managers Tell the Old West, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A10.
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percent of the water used in the West feeds agriculture and mining
interests. 268 Rural-urban transfer of water has progressed at a slow pace.269
In large part, this is due to resistance from rural water users and
communities, who see transfers as potentially threatening to rural
communities, economies, and irrigation districts.
27 0
Second, the requirement of beneficial use has also proved both too
broad and too narrow to meet the challenges of the modern day West. It is
too broad because the concept of beneficial use is static. 7 1 The bar against
wasting water in the context of incumbent uses has not progressed as
demand for water has increased or as the technologies for consuming water
have blossomed.272 On the other hand, it is too narrow because the
institutions have only begrudgingly recognized many of the emerging values
of the water in the West as beneficial.273 Additionally, even though most
states have now recognized-at least in a limited way-the value of keeping
water in rivers and streams for recreation, wildlife, and scenic values, states
have done little to pursue these values.2 74
Third, the use-it-or-lose-it aspect of beneficial use has only encouraged
use of water. When a user is inclined to not use water, she has to consider
whether this may result in losing the right to use water in the future.
2 75
268 See WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 2-22 to 2-24 (1998); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional
Perspectives on Water Poicy and Markets, 81 CAL L. REV. 671, 702 (1993).
269 See Owen L. Anderson, Reallocation, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 233, 247-53 (Robert
E. Beck ed., 1991).
270 See Gary D. Libecap, Chinatown: Owens Valley and Western Water Reallocation-Getting
the Record Straight and What It Means for Water Markets, 83 TEx. L. REV. 2055, 2056 (2005)
(quoting LiquidAssets, THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 15); Thompson, supra note 2, at 245; C.
Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and Western US Appropriative Water Rights, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 169, 197-98 (2005).
271 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE WEST 235 (1992); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 497-98 (1986).
While the case law has been slow to evolve, some courts have seemed to indicate that they are
willing to consider beneficial use in relative rather than objective terms. See, e.g., Butler,
Crockett, and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 98 P.3d 1, 11-12 (Utah
2004); Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 570 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990). Despite this, courts have been unwilling to impose relative standards in a
meaningful way.
272 Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Pefia, Community Acequias in Colorado's Rio Culebra
Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
387, 474 (2003); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 937 (1998); George W. Pring & Karen A.
Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to Conservation and Efficient Use of Water in the West;
25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-14 (1979).
273 See Jesse A. Boyd, Hp Deep. A Survey of State Instream Flow Law from the Rocky
Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1151, 1152-53 (2003).
274 See Jack Sterne, Instream Rights and Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private Instreanm
Water Rights in the North west; 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 204-05 (1997) (bemoaning the inability of state
agencies to protect instream rights).
275 Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, Water
Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203, 1213, 1215 (2006); Pring &
Tomb, supra note 272, at 25-10.
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Additionally, because conservation may result in non-use, it discourages
users to institute efficiency gains.
2 76
The greatest changes to western water management over the past
century have not come from changes to the institutions formed by the
original settlers, but rather from the creation of institutions that challenge
western water law. For example, while western water law has made no
real progress in increasing the amounts of instream flows, enforcement of
the Endangered Species Act2 77 and Clean Water Act
2 78 have. 7 9
Many scholars and commentators have highlighted the slow evolution
of western water institutions.28 The lesson to take away from all this,
however, is not just that these institutions need updating. Rather, by
solving the tragedy of the commons more than a century ago, the West
began down a path of creating and bolstering a tragic institution.
This story harmonizes well with the framework discussed above. In
fact, the factors laid out in the framework helps parse out why
incumbents have dominated rivals. Beginning with the influence of
institutions, more than the context of the spectrum or of Yellowstone, the
institutions at work here-western water rules-were explicitly designed
to strongly favor incumbents over the long term. Unlike the spectrum
where first in time, de facto meant first in right, under the prior
appropriations doctrine, this has been explicit from the beginning.
The power of incumbents increased as the water institutions became
increasingly embedded in the power structure of the West: starting as
informal norms among miners and settlers, these rules were accepted by
society generally and even written into the case law and statutes of state
governments. This full embrace of the West's water institutions have
made it very difficult to change rules when other uses of the commons
emerged.
The most substantial changes to the West's water rules has occurred
along the lines-so as it might be-of rural to urban water transfers. Here
incumbents have resisted change to a large degree, and when change has
occurred, very often incumbents have received impressive compensation
for their willingness to transfer what has become a recognized property
right to use water.
276 James N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A
Challenge for Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L REv. 503, 528-29 (1998); Karen A. Russell,
Eliminating Waste As a Way of Restoring Instream Flow, 27 ENVTL. L. 151, 156 (1997).
277 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
278 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
279 See Bricker & Filippi, supra note 260, at 737; Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant
Awakens: PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 25 ENVrL. L. 255, 256
(1995); Gregory S. Weber, The Endangered Species Act: New Weapon Enters Sixty-year Fish
,gh 3 RIVERS 276 (1992).
280 See, e.g., DONALD J. PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBuC
PoLicY, 1850-1920 23 (1996); Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting
Established Water Uses in the Pacific Northwes Despite the Rules of Pior Appropriation, 28
ENVTL. L. 881, 885-87 (1998); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 261, 288-90 (2000).
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However, while some efforts to challenge incumbents have arisen
within the context of the western water law, rivals have more commonly
avoided that battle and tried to reform western water law by latching onto
rival institutions, such as the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act. While incumbents' desire to stifle such change is no different
in the context of rival institutions, an alternative forum to address claims
to the commons has compromised incumbents' ability to resist change.
This conforms to a major assumption built into the framework: in
securing change rivals will attempt to reduce the transaction costs
change-in this context which often comes in the form of resistance from
incumbents.
B. Four Typologies of ragic Institutions
Can we make any generalizations about tragic institutions based on
these cases? In these cases and in examples of the commons more generally,
we see four faces of tragic institutions. As suggested in the framework
discussed above, the key question revolves around the extent to which the
interests of incumbents or those pushing emerging values dominate, and to
what extent.
When an incumbent institution dominates the influence of an emerging
commons, we often find that those pushing emerging values cannot alter the
incumbent institution. This may mean that we see no change or that a rival
institution embodies the value, leaving the incumbent institution-at least
for the time-untouched. On the other hand, when an emerging value
dominates the influence of an incumbent institution, we do see changes of
the incumbent institution-the only question is how much. We generally
only see incremental change, but in rare circumstances we find an emerging
value completely dominating an incumbent value. However, even in those
rare cases we often find that-despite this dominance-relics of prior
institutions remain. While each of these typologies are examined in more
detail below, the following table illustrates the categories of tragic
institutions.
Table 1: Tragic Institution Typologies
Relative Domination Complete Domination
Incumbent Institution Rival Institution Static Institution
Dominates
Emerging Value Layered Institution Residual Institution
Dominates
1. Rival Institutions
When incumbents manage to secure a strong foothold over those
pursuing emerging values, incremental change-if it comes at all-
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generally takes the form of a rival institution. Rival institutions create an
avenue for potential change without directly altering existing
institutions. This, for example, seems to explain what happened in the
context of western water and reliance on federal laws (e.g., the
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act) to protect instream
flows rather than relying on western water law. This observation is
furthered by speculation that that instream flows may not have received
such protections if drafters of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean
Water Act understood what they had unleashed."3 '
Further, those attempting to protect emerging values may look to
rival institutions when the geographic reach of an existing commons
institution differ significantly from the dimensions of the emerging value
at stake. In fact, when problems are larger than the boundaries of the
governed dimension of a commons, there might even be some economies
of scale for those promoting changes to look for ways to vest rival
institutions within entities with a broader geographical outlook. An
example that illustrates this point is the regulation of a classic
commons-our urban landscapes. 2 2 Direct land use controls are often
perceived as a matter for local government zoning. Yet, local control is
often blamed for regional problems, such as isolation of the poor 283 and
environmental challenges related to urban sprawl.2 4 The strength of local
government regulation-ability to hone in on local problems-does not
add much when the problems are regional in nature and have dimensions
that extend beyond the jurisdiction of the local government. 2 - While
local land use has been slow to change, it is not uncommon to see those
attempting to protect the rival values rely on federal laws and-to a
lesser extent-state laws to push their agenda.28 6 Perhaps because local
281 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's
Water Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 373-74 (1998).
282 See McKean, Common Property, supra note 22, at 52 n.8.
283 See BANK OF AMERICA ET. AL, BEYOND SPRAWL: NEW PATTERNS OF GROWTH TO FIT THE NEW
CALIFORNIA 7 (1995); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLIcS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 2-8 (1997); PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS: ECOLOGY,
COMMUNITY, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 20 (1993); Myron Orfield, Land Use andHousingPolicies
to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888-89
(2006); Paul A- Jargowsky, Sprawl, Concentration of Poverty, and Urban Inequalit, in URBAN
SPRAWL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES & POLICY RESPONSES 39, 40-42, 60-68 (Gregory D. Squires ed.,
2002); Owen Fiss, What Should be Done for Those Who Have Been Left Behind, 27 BOSTON REV.
4-9 (Summer 2000), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR25.3fissue.pdf; Paul A. Jargowsky,
Metropolitan Restructuring and Urban Policy, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 48 (1997).
284 JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY WORLD FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 43 (1996); Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversiy, the City, and Sprawl, 82
B.U. L. REV. 145, 179 (2002); Nicolas M. Kublicki, Innovative Solutions to Euclidean Sprawl, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 11,001, 11,003 (2001).
285 See Andrew Achincloss Lundgren, Beyond Zoning Dynamic Land Use Planning in the Age
of Sprawl, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 128 (2004) ("The virtue of zoning-its local purview-was
transforming into its vice.").
286 See JAMES M. MCELFISH, JR. & SUSAN CASEY-LEFKOwITz, SMART GROWTH AND THE CLEAN
WATER ACT 3 (2001); William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations To Bargain
for Pnvate Land Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2001); Buzbee, supra note 166, at 114-15;
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governments have proven so slow to embrace rival values, some have
even turned to market and private solutions, such as working with
homeowners' associations.28 While these rival institutions have not fully
remedied the tragic dimensions of local land use, they have at least made
some difference.
Rival institutions found in different levels of government can also
arise as a refuge for those in the commons smarting of political defeats
from incumbent institutions at a different level of government. For
example, we might see rival institutions formed at the state level attempt
to reign in a local government or rival institutions at the federal level
attempt the same to a state. A classic example of this is the institutions
built within the federal government to address discriminatory practices
that worked to exclude people of color from many important common
pool resources: access to the electoral franchise, access to the public
marketplace, access to public schools, access to the provision of state
and local government services, and access to employment opportunities.
Those seeking to create or latch onto rival institutions may also look
to the courts. In fact, courts have at times provided those pushing rival
values assistance when other branches of the government failed to do so.
Court enforcement of substantive and administrative laws often acts as a
last line of defense.
Creation or use of a rival institution generally does not immediately
resolve matters. Instead rival institutions generally translate into a
prolonged conflict. When used effectively, they can begin to channel,
constrain, and perhaps even begin to reshape existing institutions. The
conflict generally only subsides once those vested in rival institutions
find some way to stomp out the other value or make their interests
coincide.
2. Layered Institutions
When those pushing for protection of emerging values have the clout to
force existing institutions to undergo incremental change, what results is a
layered institution. The cases explored illustrate several examples of layered
institutions: changes made in the 1990s to allow for new uses of the radio
spectrum; minor changes to western water laws to begin to recognize
instream flows as a beneficial use; and, the endorsement of particular
commercial interests within Yellowstone National Park.
The cost of incremental change generally relates back to resistance of
incumbents. For this reason, we often find that incremental change provides
some sort of concession for incumbent users, which obviously works to
reduce resistance from incumbents. Perfect examples of this are all the
changes made in the 1990s to facilitate new. uses of the radio spectrum:
Neal Roberts & Otto Hetzel, The Inevitable Accretion: Federal and State Takeover of Land Use
Control, 3 URB. L. & POL'Y 105, 108-10 (1980).
287 See Wayne S. Hyatt, Conmon Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 329-32 (1998).
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limiting auctions to only new licenses; allowing unlicensed users to use
underutilized parts of the spectrum so long as this does not interfere with
incumbent uses; and only forcing television broadcasters to cease using the
analog spectrum once the vast majority of television viewers had made the
switch themselves. Examples of facilitating change without harming
incumbents are pervasive in the commons: the Clean Air Act-which
protects the air shed commons-grandfathers in emitters who built plants
prior to the passage of the Act; land use plans that permit existing
nonconforming uses; new wilderness designations often grandfathers in
existing uses.288
When we find layered institutions harming incumbent users, we
generally find incumbents giving up relatively weak, dispersed benefits to
those seeking to use a commons in a way that provides concentrated
benefits to a small number of users. This is essentially the story of how a
single railroad company became the major benefactor of Yellowstone Park's
concessions, transportation, and lodging at the turn of the twentieth century.
In other cases, incremental change confronts advantages of incumbents
more directly and provides a pathway for institutional. change that in some
ways negotiates between the interests of incumbents and that of those
supporting emerging values. This is the story of institutional change that
Elinor Ostrom tells in Governing the Commons. 9 She explains what seems
to be a hopeless tragedy of the commons of overused groundwater aquifers
in southern California and explains how a somewhat surprising decision by a
state court essentially altered the rules of the game to force groundwater
conservation.290 We also see this sort of change in the new found flexibility
mechanisms employed in the administration of the Endangered Species Act,
which have been used to shed the more unpredictable--by some accounts
even draconian-features of the Act.2 91 Yet, of course, the more a change
alters the power of incumbents, the more resistance we expect to find from
incumbents opposing that change.
3. Static Institutions
We see the face of tragic institutions most clearly when incumbent
institutions lock out emerging values. Those attempting to protect emerging
values can face significant hurdles: collective action, informal norms,
established organizations, and institutional remedies. In the case of western
water law, the institution that locked up the West's waters-"first in time-
288 See, e.g., Mitchel P. McClaran, Livestockin Wilderness..A Review and Forecas4 20 ENVTL.
L. 857, 858 (1990) (citing non-conforming uses allowed by the Wilderness Act)..
289 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2.
290 Id at 103-42.
291 See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, sec. 6, 10(a), 96
Stat. 1411, 1422-25 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000)); Habitat Conservation Plan
Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 17); see also J.B. Ruhl, Regulation byAdaptive Management. Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. ScI.
& TECH. 21, 41-42 (2005); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century A
Reportorial Fagment of Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2375, 2380-81 (2000).
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first in right"-still remains unchanged. The same is true of the radio
spectrum: since the time of Herbert Hoover broadcasters have held the
strongest bandwidths of the radio spectrum.
We often find commons with static institutions, where we do not expect
to see commons at all. The reason we do not see commons is because
incumbents have captured them so successfully that they hardly resemble
commons anymore. Take the example of the commons to split up voters
among congressional districts: gerrymandering is essentially as old as the
districts themselves. 292 These institutions have become increasingly static as
tools to carve up districts have become more robust.293 One might tell a
similar story about the creation of the BCS bowl bid system to determine
college football's national champion.
We have seen an impressive ability of institutions created to preserve
designated wilderness and even the Artic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)
to withstand change. While these institutions are clearly static institutions,
they are somewhat unique because the benefits that they provide are diffuse
and generally only enjoyed in small doses. Factors to explain such
institutions include the import of symbolic politics, willingness of the public
to pursue expressive interests where no instrumental interest is available to
them, 294 and existence of non-use values.
4. Residual Institution
The final type of tragic institutions is the residual institution. These
institutions crop up in the rare circumstance that those attempting to protect
an emerging value have the power to supplant incumbent institutions. Yet,
typically even when emerging commons completely dominate existing
institutions, it takes some persistence to stomp out the last relics of the
incumbents' institutions. Of the cases examined above, we see the residual
institution most clearly in the difficulties of the federal government to stomp
out the interests of Native Americans, trappers, and unauthorized
entrepreneurs in Yellowstone. This sort of tragic institution-though quite
rare-does appear occasionally in the commons literature, most often when
an aggressive government attempts to take away the benefits of a commons
from a small group of users.295
Sometimes, residual institutions result in relocating incumbent
institutions rather than supplanting them. This explains what has happened
with global whaling institutions over the past few decades. The International
292 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 2 (1981); MARK E. RUSH &
RICHARD L. ENGSTROM, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION?: DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM
AND MINORITY RIGHTS 9 (2001).
293 See Jeffrey C. Kubin, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEx. L. REV. 837, 854
(1997); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Polities: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political
Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1643, 1696-1702 (1993).
294 See H. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE
THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 23-24 (1997).
295 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. ROSS, TIMBER BOOMS AND INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 54-86 (2001).
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Whaling Commission (IWC) came about to regulate harvesting of whales and
to maintain the whaling stocks.296 However, by the 1980s, enough countries
that opposed harvesting whales signed onto the commission to prevail in an
effort to get the IWC to take on a moratorium on whaling.197 For a time, it
appeared that non-whaling countries had successfully hijacked whaling
decisions made on the international stage. However, by the 1990s, countries
that favored whaling began leaving the IWC.29' Some of these countries
created a new commission-the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission-and others disengaged in the international forum or did so
only with extremely lax enforcement and robust use of the IWC's
loopholes.2 9 While the IWC continues advocating for whale preservation, it
does so with substantial difficulties because it has little sway over whaling
countries and what have now become rival institutions. 
3W
Finally, it is important to note that given the prospect of complete
defeat, incumbent users, compared to others, will put up more resistance
than when faced with other sorts of change, thereby increasing the costs of
change.3°1 In the face of eminent domination by those pushing emerging
values, incumbent users have resorted to extreme measures to salvage what
value of the commons they can or even destroy the commons in protest.30 2
VII. MANAGING EMERGING COMMONS AND TRAGIC INSTITUTIONS
While institutional stability may help solve the tragedy of the
commons, stability also may create rigidity when values change. In some
ways, recognizing that the major solution to the tragedy of the commons
leads to yet another tragedy may leave us with a sense of futility. This
Part attempts to provide policy makers and others with influence over
commons with some advice about navigating this difficult tension.
296 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling arts. IV-V, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Nov. 19, 1956, 10 U.S.T. 952.
297 Review of the 33rd International Whaling Commission Meeting: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations of the H Comm. on Foreign
Affa/m, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981); International Whaling Commission, Schedule to
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946, as amended by the Commission at
the 35th Annual Meeting, July 1983, and replacing that dated February 1983, at 13 (1983). See
also INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO
CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 575-634 (Patricia Birnie ed.,
1985); DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR 98-99 (1987); David D. Caron, The International Whaling
Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission The Institutional Risks of
Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 156 (1995).
298 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 101-02 (1995).
299 See Sarah Suhre, Note, Misguided Moraity The Repercussions of the International
Whaling Commission s Shift From a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation, 12 GEO. INT'L
ENVrL. L. REV. 305, 312-16 (1999); Caron, supra note 297, at 160-64.
300 See Suhre, supra note 299, at 314-16; Caron, supra note 297, at 160-64.
301 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 200.
M See, e.g., Ross, supra note 295, at 54-86.
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Part VILA briefly discusses the difficulties associated with balancing
two often conflicting goals: institutional stability and institutional
responsiveness. In cases where stability has become or threatens to
become rigidity, this Part proposes several design principles for
responsive institutions. These principles are meant to supplement-not
supplant-Ostrom's "design principles ... [of] ... long-enduring
institutions."3 0 3 In significant ways, these proposed principles connect
the literature with several other bodies of literature, particularly the
political ecology literature on resilience and the adaptive management
literature.
Part VII.B attempts to draw some general conclusions about the
sorts of circumstances that may shift the 9 ptimal balance of institutional
stability and adaptability. This discussion looks at factors that can shift
the feasibility and desirability of altering the balance between stability
and responsiveness.
A. Design Principles for a Changing World
The "design principles... [of] ... long-enduring institutions" put
forward by Ostrom 4 and others help address the tragedy of the commons.
Yet, these principles ignore that with a change of circumstances and values
sensible institutions can morph into tragic institutions. So, even though the
traditional measuring stick may suggest an institution is successful, once we
take into account multiple uses of a commons, we may decide the same
institutions are failing. A theme of this Article is that design principles that
do not allow for institutional evolution spells trouble in a changing world.
Yet, it is difficult to find pathways that avoid tragedies of the commons and
tragic institutions because stable institutions and responsive institutions are
often uneasy companions.
The road to responsive institutions is not an easy one. First, in
institutional design, specifics have great import; it is a complex task.3"5 And,
as the case study regarding regulation of the radio spectrum illustrates,
merely providing an agency broad discretion generally does not solve the
problem.3 6 Second, changes generally work against incumbent users and are
therefore often politically difficult. Third, efforts to create responsiveness
and stability sometimes conflict.
This article-of course-is not the first to focus on the benefits of
responsive institutions. In fact, threads of this insight are found in the
303 OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 90.
304 Id.
305 See id at 22.
306 See Josh Eagle, Regional Ocean Governance: The Perils of Multiple Use-Management and
the Promise of Agency Diversity 16 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 143, 158 (2006) ("Agency
balancing is a flawed concept for several reasons. First, many resource uses are truly
incompatible and thus cannot be 'balanced,' in the common sense of the word. For example, it
is impossible for a backcountry hiker to enjoy a wilderness experience in the middle of a forest
clear-cut.").
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sometimes overlapping literatures of new institutionalism, 3° 7 political
ecology,3°s and adaptive management.3°9 Yet, significantly, this is the first
real introduction to the topic rooted in the commons literature. In the
commons, the goal of institutional stability is often so lofty that we have
overlooked the threat of potential rigidity.Recognizing the difficulty of supplementing stable institutions with
increased adaptability, the following draft principles provide some guidance
to decision makers. These principles are meant to start the conversation.
Particularly, given the substantial literature that these principles draw upon,
it is likely these principles would benefit if they were revisited by those who
are much more vested in those academic projects.
The following principles are a starting point for the next chapter of the
commons literature:
Help institutions evolve by continually exposing them to competing
values. Most stable commons institutions are governed by those good at
seeking and adapting to new information: it is vital for institutional survival.
Yet, those charged with maintaining institutions-particularly incumbents-
often resist information that conflicts with their interests. The first step to
remedying tragic institutions is to provide an outlet to highlight rifts between
incumbents and competing values. Procedural features that allow for robust
public participation, governance transparency, and disclosure of impacts of
307 See, e.g., NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 34; KNIGHT, supra note 34; OLSON, supra note
48; JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS
OF POLITICS (1989); The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Walter W. Powell &
Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, The Market, and The Law (1990);
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985); ThrAinn Eggertsson,
Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990); JAMES BUCHANAN, JAMES & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
308 See e.g, NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR COMPLEXITY
AND CHANGE (Fikret Berkes et al. eds., 2003); LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS:
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE (Fikret Berkes et al.
eds., 1998); BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS (Lance H.
Gunderson, et al, eds., 1995); DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990); C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive
Cycles, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 25
(Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); Lance H. Gunderson, Ecological Resilience: In
Theory and Application, 31 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS 425 (2000); C. S. Holling,
Reslience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS 1
(1973).
309 See, e.g., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holing ed.,
1978); KAI N. LEE, COMPASS & GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT (1993); C.J. WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986);
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (J.A.E. Oglethorpe ed., 2002). Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges
of 'New Age" Enviromnental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50 (2001); Gerald Andrews Emison,
The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and Environmental
Quality Policy, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 167 (1996); Daniel A. Farber, Environmental
Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994); John M. Volkman & Willis
E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, The Endangered Species Act,
andAdaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249 (1993).
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policy decisions expose these rifts3. 0 In addition to conflict, this can lead to
the consideration of creative solutions and alternativesa
1 1
A void credible commitments that tie up the commons. Often commons
users require some inducement to accept an institution that reduces short-
term consumption in favor of long-term sustainability 1 2  Providing
privileged access to the commons often seems like an easy way, and
sometimes an unavoidable prerequisite, to induce commons users to accept
institutions. Yet, where viable options remain, it may be worthwhile to
consider providing alternative incentives (e.g., side payments or credible
threats). Even when commitments are given, they can be included with
caveats, such as sunset provisions or reservations for other foreseeable
uses.
313
Work toward integrating piecemeal policies. Because we often let
crowding dictate when we govern the commons, we tend to build
institutions to protect one value of the commons at a time.314 Integrated
institutions that reflect multiple values are often more apt to grapple with
the complexities of the commons.3 1 5 "Successful" institutions that maximize
a single or a few values may actually cause tragedies along other dimensions
of the commons. In suggesting this, it is obvious that it is not enough to
merely provide that an agency recognize multiuse. Integration means tying
policies together in sensible ways and not just expanding the purview of an
entity overseeing a commons.
Within sensible bounds, allow trading among users and uses. Many
commons institutions often specifically forbid trading of any institutional
advantages provided to commons users.3 1 6 Not surprisingly, this use-it-or-
lose-it approach tends to entrench incumbents. Trading among users can
loosen the grip of the past's institutions over today's decisions. Yet, trading
can lead to unintended and undesired consequences, so we should still
monitor trading regimes closely.
3 17
310 See generally CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986)
(advocating for an adaptive management style with respect to renewable resources "where
management activities themselves are viewed as the primary tools for experimentation" and
"errors can be detected and used as a basis for further learning"); ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 19-20 (C.S. Holing ed., 1978) (discussing an adaptive style of
both assessment and management and advocating for an "adaptive process of policy design"
specifically involving an influx of knowledge to spur innovation and increase consideration of
possible effects).
311 See KA1 N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT 87-88 (1993).
312 See supra Part II.B.
313 Moe, supra note 77, at 89-95.
314 See supra Part VI.A
315 See C.S. Holing, What Barriers? What Bridges, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE
RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 6-9 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995).
316 See Dagan & Heller, supra note 53, at 566.
317 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodificadon of EnvironmentMa
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 693-94 (2000); Thomas C. Schelling, Prices as Regulatory
Instruments, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1, 39 (Thomas C. Schelling ed.,
1983).
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Build mechanisms to internahze externalities. An externality is a cost of
a decision shouldered by someone other than the decision makers.31
Externalities can describe many of the problems related to emerging
commons. Particularly where policies are not integrated, this helps to create
incentives among commons incumbents to take into account rival values.
31 9
Provide incentives for users to conserve the commons. Conserving the
commons, obviously, leaves more to go around for all potential users.
Conservation is often expensive. Not surprisingly, when commons
institutions fail to promote conservation, change comes slowly. Policy
carrots can send signals to incumbents that encourage them to value
conservation or at least desire to avoid wasteful practices.
320
Create litmted rights for those with interests in the commons. Providing
all users-privileged and otherwise-tools to oversee and perhaps even
challenge decisions of those governing the commons creates avenues for
change and limits the degree to which institutions become encrusted. The
tools to accomplish this include what might be characterized as
administrative process protections: the right to provide input, analyze, and
even challenge decisions regarding the commons. This might also include
providing those with an interest the ability to bring legal causes of action
(e.g., specific remedies or the right to bring citizen suits). Of course, for such
protections to have meaning, the person or entity providing redress must be
somewhat impartial.
If necessary, buy out interests of entrenched users. Sometimes
accommodating incumbent users and emerging values is not possible. 321
When the interests of entrenched users and emerging values and emerging
commons are irreconcilable, buying out conflicting users often makes sense:
it is a pathway out of political turmoil or gridlock.
B. Finding the Right Mix Between Institutional Stability and Responsiveness
While the design principles laid out above attempt to avoid direct
conflicts with Ostrom's principles that promote stability, to some extent this
is irresolvable: the former resists change and the later facilitates it. So, those
with influence over institutional design will need to determine how much
weight to put into stability as compared to adaptability.
In finding the right mix, practical concerns will often constrain
available options. For the most part, incumbents will favor stability over
responsiveness because it favors their interests. Given the difficulties in
solving the tragedy of the' commons, institutional survival may require
leaving fledgling institutions alone until they have acquired sufficient
stability. Yet, this is a difficult balance because waiting too long to begin
building in responsiveness may significantly increase the costs of reform.
While these timing issues are difficult, we might find some comfort in that,
318 See Coase, The Problem of Social Cos4 supra note 34, at 1-2.
319 See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 348.
320 See YOUNG, supra note 30, at 81 (discussing the role of regulatory oversight).
321 See NORTH, INSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 90.
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generally speaking, by the time a particular use begins to crowd out others,
change will not risk introducing a tragedy of the commons. Yet, acting
before interests collide can often reduce the political costs of moving ahead.
Second, when we think that our institutions have got it right, we might
resist adding more responsiveness to institutional design. 322 This contention
has the greatest weight when the trajectory of a commons institution bucks
the typical evolutionary trend. The typical trajectory first sees institutions
(i.e., crowding) for those uses of the commons that serve relatively small
numbers of tight-knit people, who utilize a localized dimension of a
commons in pursuit of economic gain. Institutions that generally come later
protect values that benefit larger numbers of people, focus on broader
dimensions of the commons, and maximize non-market values. Surface
water is a well recognized commons that illustrates this trajectory: water
institutions first emerged to allocate the commons to agriculture or to some
other highly consumptive use like mining; over time demands grew from
municipal water users; still later, we saw institutions for demandto preserve
instream flows for scenic, recreation, and wildlife values. However, when we
do not see the typical trajectory of institutional evolution, we might resist
change because it may risk a shift from accommodating more people to
fewer people, from less consumptive uses to more consumptive uses, from
regional dimensions to local dimensions, and non-market values to market-
driven values. While we can explain part of this by individual preferences,
such reservations may also stem from concerns relating to collective action
problems: those values we tend to protect first in the commons are those
values with the smallest collective action problems. 323 When institutions
emerge in spite of greater collective action costs, it may raise concerns that
increasing the responsiveness of institutions may give those values facing
less substantial collective action costs a second opportunity to prevail over
incumbent uses that are, for some reason, preferred.
Third, stability might be favored over responsiveness when a commons
is nonrenewable or at least slow to renew because responsiveness might
lead to more consumptive uses of the commons, which might be difficult or
impossible to reverse. It is somewhat troubling-a paradox of
preservation-that the more a commons is preserved for less consumptive
uses, the more attractive it might seem to those who would use the
commons for more consumptive uses: the more a commons is preserved, the
more it becomes a target. In contrast, the more a commons user destroys the
value of a commons for other users, the less competition we are likely to
find over the commons.
The combination of collective action problems and perceived non-
renewability of resources causes many to hesitate at the suggestion of
increased institutional adaptability. This, for example, explains why
322 See YOUNG, supra note 30, at 80-81.
323 The costs of collective action increase as the number of users increase, the distance
between users increases, and the per capita benefit decreases. See supra Part V.A. Likewise,
the more a use is market-driven, the more likely it is that commons users will be willing to
invest in institutions to protect the commons and to lock-in privileged access to its benefits. Id.
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suggestions to auction off national parks324 cause many to pause. Such a
proposal incites concern that benefactors of this responsive mechanism
might end up excluding large segments of those who currently use the
national parks or that the use (e.g., developments of bed and breakfasts,
condos, and high-end cabins) might damage what is left of the sense of
wilderness found in national parks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For four decades, the academic literature surrounding the commons
has primarily focused on identifying and attempting to solve tragedies of the
commons. An entire body of literature focuses on the role of stable
institutions. Yet, this important scholarship neglects the fact that seemingly
successful institutions create new problems because stability becomes
rigidity when the way we value commons changes.
When values change and interest percolates in shaping institutions to
protect an emerging dimension of the commons, the institutions of the past
often stand in the way. Thus the heart of many of today's challenges in
governing the commons arise from attempts to solve yesterday's looming
tragedies. In taking a closer look at this problem, we find that the resistance
of institutions to account for change is not a matter of chance but rather of
design. In order to muster the support to overcome tragedies of the
commons, we tend to create institutions that myopically define the value of
the commons and that lock in protections of the commons by providing
users credible commitments so that they-and nobody else-will benefit
from the sacrifices necessary to overcome tragedies of the commons.
Further, once users gain privileged access to the commons, it generally
follows that those users invest in maintaining and expanding these gains. To
the extent incumbent institutions increase the cost of change, an institution
is a tragic institution.
Whether or not an institution will increase the cost of change hinges on
the extent to which an emerging value conflicts with the interests of the
incumbent users and the institutional mechanism that governs them.
Whether an emerging commons or an incumbent institution prevails hinges
on several factors: the willingness of those supporting the emerging value
and the incumbent institutions to invest in maintaining or changing an
institution; the degree of power of each of these groups; and the degree to
which either party can harness institutions in pursuit of their gains. Tragic
institutions can take different forns, sometimes completely dominating rival
uses, sometimes limiting changes to incremental changes, and sometimes
creeping into the picture even when it appears that an emerging commons is
so well rooted that it appears to have extinguished the incumbent use all
together.
324 For example, some claim the National Park System Reform Act (H.R. 260), sometimes
referred to as the Parks Closing Commission Bill, was a scheme to put hundreds of national
parks on the auction block. See Congressional Press Release, Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator,
Democrats Fight Republican Assaults on the Environment (Apr. 22, 1997) (on file with author).
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Tragic institutions challenge our prior conceptions of how to define
institutional success in the commons. Rather than defining institutional
success with institutional stability, tragic institutions highlight the need for
institutional responsiveness as well. While institutions need some degree of
stability to stave off the tragedy of the commons, the prevalence of tragic
institutions in the commons suggest that we have over invested in stability
and sold short responsiveness. Still, responsiveness is not much of an option
where there is institutional fragility. Additionally, even when it is an option,
we may have qualms, particularly when the current institutional mix has
overcome collective action challenges and found ways to protect values that
focus on broader dimensions of the commons, less consumptive uses,
incorporating broader numbers of users, and non-market driven values. We
also may have concerns when extraction of a commons is nonrenewable or
at least slow to renew. In such cases, stability may serve heroic rather than
tragic purposes. Yet, most often, a close examination suggests that less
reliance on stability and more reliance on responsiveness would work to the
greatest good.
